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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1980s there has been strong interest in labor-management
cooperation. That interest was reflected even in government attention,
for example, through projects by the U.S. Department of Labor's Bureau
of Labor-Management Cooperation. Under the leadership of Undersec-
retary Stephen Schlossberg, the Bureau's "Laws Project" examined the
impact of labor law on labor-management cooperation.' The Dunlop
Commission issued a report strongly in favor of labor-management co-
operation,2 and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Chair William
B. Gould has spoken favorably of it! More recently, the government
issued a report on state and local initiatives in this area.
Currently, the concept of labor-management cooperation is receiv-
ing strong support from some scholars, politicians, and employer groups
as a way to improve U.S. competitiveness. That support is exemplified
by the introduction of the Teamwork for Employees and Management
(TEAM) Act in Congress to facilitate the development of labor-
management cooperation by amending § 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).'
1. The author was a member of the Laws Project in 1987 and worked on one of its
published reports concerning the interaction of the duty of fair representation and labor-
management cooperation. See BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND
COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, Labor-Management and the Duty of Fair
Representation, in U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOP-
ERATION, SECOND INTERIM REPORT 39 (1987).
2. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 2-4 (1994); see, e.g., COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT FINDING REPORT (1994); Arthur J. Martin, Current Critical
Issues in Labor and Employment Law: Company Sponsored Employee Involvement: A Union
Perspective, 40 ST. LOUIS L.J. 119, 129-30 (1996) (describing the history of the Dunlop
Commission).
3. See William B. Gould, Labor Policy by and beyond the NLRB: Globalization, Cor-
porate Reorganization, and the American Workforce, in BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC.
Remarks by NLRB Chairman William B. Gould to the Commonwealth Club of California,
152 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Aug. 4, 1997, at E-I.
4. See WORKING TOGETHER FOR PUBLIC SERVICE: REPORT OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF
LABOR'S TASK FORCE ON EXCELLENCE IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH
LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION (1996).
5. See Teamwork for Employees and Management (TEAM) Act, S.295, 105th Cong.
(1997); As TEAM ACT Moves through Congress, Employers Pursue Employee Jnvolvment,
EMPL. REL. WKLY. (BNA), Mar. 17, 1997, at 255; NAM Offers Agenda for Helping Workers
That Stresses Worker Involvement of TEAM, LAB. REL. WK., Mar. 5, 1997, at 229. The
TEAM Act was approved in March 1997 by the Senate Labor and Human Resources Com-
mittee. President Clinton vetoed a virtually identical bill in 1996 and threatened that he
would veto its successor if it was sent to the White House. See Steelworkers: House Demo-
crats Criticize GOP Study of US. Labor Policies, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 16, 1997, at
DI 1; Michael H. LeRoy, "Dealing With" Employee Involvement in Nonunion Workplaces:
Empirical Research Implications for the TEAM Act and Electromation, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
[V1ol. 19:873
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The TEAM Act and the impact of labor-management cooperation
are hotly debated issues.' As with most proposed legislation, it is impos-
sible to know how the TEAM Act would function if it were to be
enacted. No social science experiment can be run to gauge its operation
and predict its likely effect. There are simply no social laboratories
complete with control groups and replicability. Even if there were, the
best of such experiments could not capture the complex ways in which
law interacts with society.
In this arena comparative law is not based on a superficial reading
of statutes or cases, but, rather on an in-depth examination of society's
laws and values. As a result, it is possible to use the experience of a
comparable country as if it were a laboratory in which the experiment
has been run. In this case, New Zealand's six year experience under the
Employment Contracts Act 1991 (ECA) is particularly useful. The ECA
has created the conditions under which labor-management cooperation
has been used as a replacement for collective bargaining. Thus, analyz-
ing the ECA can be used as a means of gaining a clearer understanding
of the likely ways in which the TEAM Act would function were it to be
enacted.
I. ARGUMENTS CONCERNING LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION
Proponents of labor-management cooperation make several interre-
lated arguments concerning the use of cooperation as a replacement for
the NLRA. First, these proponents contend that the form and function of
unions must change so that unions will engage in cooperative efforts
rather than take adversarial positions. Second, we must alter the pur-
poses of labor law from supporting a narrow focus on increasing wages
to promoting win-win bargaining and employer productivity and com-
petitiveness. Third, employers must be given the opportunity to affect or
choose the form of unionization that will best serve the needs of the en-
terprise. Finally, since employees would prefer labor-management
cooperation to adversarial unions, labor-management cooperation would
reverse the decline of unionization. Each of these claims is hotly con-
tested. Unfortunately, the argument on both sides is infused with passion
but has so far suffered from an inability to rely on empirical evidence.
This article will first sketch the arguments on each of these points
made in the United States and compare them to arguments made in sup-
REV. 31, 79-82 (1997) (providing the history of 8(a)(2) and recent efforts to amend it); see
also PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EM-
PLOYMENT LAW 283-95 (1990).
6. See discussion infra Part I.A.
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port of the enactment of New Zealand's ECA. It will then examine the
empirical evidence available from New Zealand's experience, which
provides a rich understanding of how the changes to its labor law from
one based in a system of collective bargaining and industrial relations to
one based on freedom of contract have operated, and how the system of
labor-management cooperation, which has grown up in the context of
the new law, has functioned.
A. Changing the Form and Function of Unions
Some argue that U.S. unions are mired in an adversarial, rigid sys-
tem.7 Proponents of this view argue that unions make no positive
contribution to the economy because they press for increased wages and
thus lower firm profits.' To ameliorate this situation requires using "a
greater measure of freedom of contract [that] would open up opportuni-
ties for the development of different models of unionism and labor-
management relations," creating "value-added" unionism-that is,
"organizations that give employees greater voice in articulating their
concerns and that negotiate and administer collective goods like griev-
ance procedures, but without undermining firm profits or managerial
flexibility."9 Increasing union density is, indeed, positively associated
with promoting decreased inequality of wages."O
By seeking to create links among workers across the boundaries of
individual employers, the multi-employer unions found in the United
States promote adversarial behavior that does not focus on promoting
employer productivity. Unions try to channel worker "discontent into
support for an organization external to the firm that will press for in-
dustry-wide wages and rules that narrowly confine management
authority. Though workers organize as employees of a firm, unions are
7. See Anna S. Rominger, Rethinking the Paradigm: Can the Wagner Act and Labor-
Management Cooperation Coexist?, 8 DEPAuL BUS. L.J. 159, 185 (1996).
8. See Samuel Estreicher, Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform: Opening up
the Possibilities for Value-Added Unionism, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 827, 830 (1996); see also
CHARLES HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING
CORPORATION 7-27 (1988).
9. Estreicher, supra note 8, at 829. See generally Richard Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984); see also Gail Herriot, The New Feudalism:
The Unintended Destination of Contemporary Trends in Employment Law, 28 GA. L. REV.
167 (1993); Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform,
DALY LAB. REP. (BNA), June 5, 1995, at E-10.
10. See generally, Martin Asher & Robert De Fina, The Impact of Changing Union Den-
sity on Earnings Inequality: Evidence from the Private and Public Sectors, 18 J. LAB. RES.
425 (1997); Javed Ashraf, The Effect of Unions on Professors' Salaries: The Evidence over
Twenty Years, 18 J. LAB. RES. 439 (1997).
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principally multiemployer organizations."" To combat this negative ap-
proach to workplace governance, "[l]abor laws should narrow, rather
than widen, the divergence of perspective between the union and the
firm"
12
To address this problem, unions could take a range of forms, the
best of which would be as consultants to employers. Union leaders
would be financed by employers to perform this task. 3 The ideal union
would be an enterprise union representing employees of only one em-
ployer instead of employees of multiple employers. Multi-employer
unions would then be only service providers offering employees access
to lawyers, actuaries, placement advisers, and other professional serv-
ices.' These two new forms of unions would compete for members with
local unions, which would be mere "administrative units of traditional,
adversarial organizations pursuing industry wage and job control poli-
cies., '5
Promoting labor-management cooperation is not a new concept.
Similar views were expressed by employers during debates for the
NLRA' 6 Indeed, the question of control and the origins of conflict
within the work relationship have long been debated by industrial rela-
tions scholars.'7 Although it can be seen as a negative that U.S. unions
are institutions which workers seek out when they are unhappy; others
would argue that such a safety valve is necessary." The NLRA expressly
wanted unions were to be a vehicle by which workers could effectively
express and remedy their discontent, which Congress found was imper-
iling the U.S. economy.' 9 The NLRA's "Findings and Policies" state that
the NLRA was enacted to channel employee discontent in order to pre-
vent unredressed discontents from injuring commerce.'
11. Estreicher, supra note 8, at 830.
12. Estreicher, supra note 9, at ElO, E14.
13. See Estreicher, supra note 8, at 833-34.
14. See id.; see also Janice Bellace, Labor Law Reform for the Post-Industrial Work-
place, 45 LAB. L. J. 461, 462-63 (1994).
15. Estreicher, supra note 8, at 834.
16. See Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power Symbol, and
Workplace Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1460 (1993).
17. See generally, STEPHEN M. HILLS, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 3-4 (1995).
18. In Rivethead, Ben Hamper tells how he and another General Motors line worker
fantasized about making "a violent bluecollar docudrama called No Need for the Grievance
Procedure. It would be a collection of short pieces that chronicled the systematic executions
of our least favorite shoplords." BEN HAMPER, RIVETHEAD: TALES FROM THE ASSEMBLY
LINE 125 (1991).
19. See JAMES ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 35-43
(1983).
20. See NLRA § 1; 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1973).
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Unions should be expected to push for increased wages given that
the NLRA was enacted to achieve precisely this end. The NLRA draft-
ers believed that unions needed to be strong enough to press for higher
wages and thus put an end to the underconsumption and disinflation
which had led to the Depression.' The NLRA states that inequality of
bargaining power "substantially burdens and affects the flow of com-
merce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in in-
dustry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates and
working conditions within and between industries.
22
Collective bargaining need not be viewed as adversarial simply be-
cause the relationship exists to mediate conflict. Indeed, collective
bargaining agreements have been referred to as the original "quality of
work life" (QWL) documents. 3 They are essentially systems of self-
governance under a private rule of law. As such, collective bargaining
has provided the means to empower workers and thus represents an all
too rare opportunity for workers to learn the skills of participatory de-
mocracy.2' The NLRA itself supports cooperation of a kind that can exist
only between equals by embodying the understanding that employers
organized in the corporate form cannot meaningfully cooperate with
their individual employees. 2
21. See ATLESON, supra note 19, at 41-42; See generally, CHARLES GREGORY &
HAROLD KATZ, LABOR AND THE LAW 223-30 (3d ed. 1979).
22. NLRA § 1; 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (1973).
23. See Labor-Management Cooperation and the Duty of Fair Representation, U.S. La-
bor Law and the Future of Labor-Management Cooperation 39, 43-44 (2d Interim Rep.
1987) ; see also Charles Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective Bar-
gaining Process, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 571, 624-25 (1990)
24. See United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 580
(1960); see also Thomas Kohler, Civic Virtue a Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Vir-
tue, 36 B.C. L. REV. 279, 298 (1995).
25. See Elaine Bernard, Democracy in the U.S.: Why Unions Matter (1995) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). Thomas Kohler observes:
Unions are autonomous bodies. They stand independently of the state and the or-
ganizations that employee their members. They come into being as a result of
employee self-organization, and their health and continuing existence depends
upon the ability of the members to maintain solidarity. Winner-take-all attitudes
don't produce enduring relationships or democracies. Unions can provide a forum
where people can learn to prevail on a point without triumphalism, to lose an ar-
gument without resentment, and most importantly of all, to practice the art of
reasonable and responsible compromise.
Kohler, supra note 24, at 300; see also James Zimarowski, A Primer on Power Balancing
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 47, 65-66 (1989).
26. See Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Coop-
eration: From Bureaucratic to Flexible Production, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 795-96 (1994).
See infra text, at nn. 326-328.
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Not only can unions engage in labor-management cooperation, but
many unions, which might be described as adversarial, have actively
embraced labor-management cooperation during recent decades."
Studies have shown that independent unions offer something of value
not only to employees but also to employers. Labor-management coop-
eration programs tend to be more successful in firms, in which
employees are represented by unions.2 It cannot be assumed that unions
are necessarily and irrationally adversarial or that it is unions which cre-
ate adversarial relationships.
Charles Morris observes that it is a myth "that an adversarial rela-
tionship between unions and management is inherent in the NLRA,"
although it often appears to be "conventional wisdom.., that coopera-
tive labor relations and employee participation programs are unnatural
to the NLRA. It is too simplistic to label the NLRA system 'adversarial'
and leave it at that."' ' It seems illogical to conclude that unions are the
source of an adversarial dynamic about which we should be concerned
when there is strong evidence that an important source of conflict comes
from U.S. employers. In recent years, U.S. employers have increased
their opposition to unions, as part of their ongoing efforts to assert con-
trol over work processes'o as evidenced by the rising merit factor in
NLRB cases3 and documented hostility to unionization. 2 Among the
27. See James Atleson, Law and Union Power: Thoughts on the United States and Can-
ada, 42 BUFF. L. REv. 463, 495-96 (1994); Thomas Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:
The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), 27 B. C. L. REv. 499, 510-12 (1986). See
also JOSEPH FUNCINI & SJZY FUNCINI, WORKING FOR THE JAPANESE: INSIDE MAZDA'S
AMERICAN AUTO PLANT (1990); Labor-Management Cooperation: Members of 24 Union
Locals Approve Partnership Pact With Kaiser, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), June 4, 1997, at D8.
28. See Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett Harrison, Unions, Technology and Labor-
Management Cooperation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS 247 (Lawrence
Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992).
29. Charles Morris, A Blueprint for Reform of the National Labor Relations Act, 8
ADMIN. L.J. 517,526 (1994). See also Kohler, supra note 27, at 513-16.
30. For a discussion of these efforts and the impact they have had on the economy, see,
for example, SAMUEL BowLEs ET AL., AFTER THE WASTELAND: A DEMOCRATIC ECONOMICS
OF THE YEAR 2000 (1990). In particular, the authors observe that a "corporate counteroffen-
sive against labor began aggressively in the mid-1970's." Id. at 124.
31. See WILLIAM COOKE, UNION ORGANIZING AND PUBLIC POLICY: FAILURE TO
SECURE FIRST CONTRACTS 49 (1985); Atleson supra note 27, at 477-84. Board filings and
findings of unfair labor practices are highly inaccurate as to the absolute degree of employer
opposition because truly effective opposition may mean that no charges are ever filed as to
illegal activity and Board processes may mean that meritorious charges do not result in final
Board decisions.
Many European employers have taken a very different view of their relationships with
unions and refer to them as social partners. See Kohler, supra note 24, at 287.
32. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behavior in Certification Elections and First
Contract Campaigns: Implications for Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75 (Sheldon Friedman et al., eds. 1994); Kate Bronfenbrenner &
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most extreme tactics to oppose unionization is the threat to close a plant
or the actual closing of a plant. A recent study found that, in a sample of
NLRB election cases filed in units of over fifty for 1993-1995: (1) em-
ployers threatened to close the plant in at least fifty percent of cases; (2)
in an additional eighteen percent of cases, the employer threatened to
close the plant after the union won an election; and (3) in twelve percent
of cases in which the union won the election, the employer actually
closed the plant.3 When the study examined only industries in which
credible threats to move could be made, there were threats to close in
sixty-two percent of cases.4 Indeed, to focus on only one part of the
equation is to ignore history. The system which now exists evolved as a
result of the interactions of all parties-unions, non-union and union
employees, employers, and the government's branches.
Indeed, some of the differing views when discussing labor-
management cooperation are the result of its being such a loose concept.
Although it is commonly thought to refer to one sort of work practice,
labor-management cooperation is in fact a general term that comprises a
range of ways work can be organized and includes many different moti-
vations. Labor-management cooperation can include rotating jobs,
enlarging or enriching job content to reverse Taylorist deskilling, in-
creasing worker responsibility and self-management, allowing workers
to participate more directly in decision-making on issues ranging from
work assignments to quality control to personnel decisions and griev-
ance handling. Labor-management cooperation can take place through
committees, teams, quality circles, employee involvement and problem
Tom Juravich, The Impact of Employer Opposition of Union Certification Win Rates: A
Private/Public Sector Comparison (Feb. 1995) (working paper no. 113, Economic Policy
Institute) (on file with the author); Richard Hurd & Joseph Uehlein, Patterned Responses to
Organizing: Case Studies of the Union Busting Convention, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 32, at 61; see generally, DAVID C. KORTEN, WHEN
CORPORATIONS RuLE THE WORLD 61-86 (1995).
33. See, e.g., Kate Bronfenbrenner, Final Report: The Effects of Plant Closing or Threat
of Plant Closing on the Right of Workers to Organize, Report to the Labor Secretariat of the
North American Commission for Labor Cooperation, Sept. 30, 1996.
34. See id. Threats included verbal threats as well as:
attaching shipping labels to equipment throughout the plant with a Mexican ad-
dress, to posting maps of North America with an arrow pointing from the current
plant site to Mexico, to a letter directly stating that the company will have to shut
down if the union wins the election.... The most blatant example of this involved
ITT" Automotive in Michigan, where the company parked thirteen flat-bed tractor-
trailers loaded with shrink-wrapped production equipment in front of the plant for
the duration of the campaign with large hot-pink signs posted on the side which
read 'Mexico Transfer Job.'
Id. at 11.
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solving." One goal of labor-management cooperation programs is the
promotion of employee job satisfaction that will in turn lead to greater
worker commitment to the job in order to achieve management goals of
higher productivity and lower employee resistance to change.3 Thus, it
is impossible to know exactly what is meant by any labor-management
cooperation program when the term is used without explaining the de-
tails of its operation.
Opponents of labor-management cooperation do not see it as an in-
stitution to increase worker empowerment and workplace democracy,
but focus on labor-management cooperation's use in the United States as
a "style or theory of management. '37 As such, proposals to increase the
use of labor-management cooperation are seen as plans to increase man-
agement power and reduce true quality of working life by permitting
employers to "manage by stress. 3 It is worthy of note that the same
programs taught by QWL consultants are also used in seminars training
employers how to deunionize or to remain union-free. 9 Opponents of
35. See DONALD WELLS, EMPTY PROMISES: QuALirY OF WORKING LIFnE PROGRAMS
AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT 1-2 (1987); Kohler, supra note 27, at 500-10; Martin, supra
note 2, at 119.
36. See Susan Schwochau et al., Employee Participation and Assessments of Supportfor
Organizational Policy Changes, 18 J. LAB. RES. 379, 380-85 (1997). It has been pointed out
that the way, in which benefits arising from teams have been studied, presents special con-
cers. First, these studies have tended to focus on economic outcomes, assuming that there
must be a link between positive economic results and worker satisfaction. Second, some
studies have focused only on team benefits and have thus failed to consider or learn whether
there might not be psychological or other problems associated with teams. See Hannah
Knudsen & Leon Grunberg, The Promise and Reality of Teamwork at a Large American
Company 6 (1997) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
37. Kohler, supra note 27, at 500-03 (describing various theories and applications as
well as the history of labor-management cooperation schemes during the twentieth century in
the U.S.).
38. MIKE PARKER, INSIDE THE CIRCLE: A UNION GUIDE TO QWL (1985); General Mo-
tors once used a person dressed as a mascot as an attempt to improve quality. See HAMPER,
supra note 18, at 112-15 (1991).
39. See Wells, supra note 35, at 5-6; see also PARKER, supra note 38. In 1981, GM cir-
culated a memo among its executives encouraging them to use QWL programs to subvert the
union's collective bargaining demands. See Wells, supra note 35, at 106; see also
GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, INHUMAN RELATIONS: QUALrY CIRCLES AND ANTI-UNIONISM IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1988).
A recent study of NLRB elections during 1994 found such programs in thirty-two per-
cent of elections, a dramatic increase from eight years earlier, when a similar study found
them in only seven percent of election campaigns. Furthermore, the new study found that the
existence of LMC programs significantly decreases the union win rate. The employer's anti-
union campaign also tended to be more aggressive where LMC programs existed, and there
tended to be more unfair labor practices committed. Furthermore, the LMC programs were
dominated, rather than merely assisted, by the employer. Jim Rundle, Winning Hearts and
Minds: Union Organizing in the Era of Employee Involvement Programs, in ORGANIZING TO
WIN 213 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al., 1998); see also Bronfenbrenner, supra note 32; Bron-
fenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 32.
Spring 1998]
Michigan Journal of International Law
labor-management cooperation may be concerned about advocating
such a step because unions have both historically and recently spear-
headed efforts to improve workers' lives and promote democracy.
4
0
Beyond seeing unions as mere actors in the marketplace, some
would argue that unions promote justice, equality, and democracy.
4'
Solidarity among workers without regard to where they are employed is
fundamental to the cause of working people and to labor law. Solidarity
across employers allows workers to know and care about what is hap-
pening elsewhere and then to make common cause with one another.42
Thus, weakening solidarity by strengthening attachment and identifica-
tion with only one employer means limiting union strength and, to some
degree, transforming unions into altogether different entities. Indeed,
the NLRA supports cross-employer solidarity by defining "employee"
to include any employee, not limited to the employees of a particular
employer.4'3 This definition grows out of pre-NLRA experience with ju-
dicial interpretations which limited worker power by narrowly defining
worker interests.4
Charles Gregory, for example, asked why the use of concerted ac-
tion by workers to use their freedom to contract by exerting their
collective economic power was a crime at common law; he answered:
Since individual refusals of wage earners to work under condi-
tions not acceptable to them had no discernible effect on the
national economy, the vice was combination and concerted ac-
tion. Hence judges found it possible to maintain the principle of
freedom of contract-at least for individuals-and at the same
time to declare unlawful the united efforts of workers to change
the conditions under which they worked.'
40. See Kohler, supra note 24, at 287-89.
41. See, e.g., PARKER, supra note 38; see also LABOR RESEARCH REVIEW, CON-
FRONTING GLOBAL POWER: UNION STRATEGIES FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY (1995)
[hereinafter LRR].
42. See, e.g., PARKER, supra note 38; see also LRR, supra note 41.
43. See NLRA § 2(3); 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(3) (1978).
44. For a history of judicial decisions that have limited worker solidarity, see GREGORY
& KATZ, supra note 21, at 222. A sympathy strike or refusal to handle "hot cargo" offers
workers an opportunity to strengthen themselves by making common cause in addition to
demonstrating their solidarity across the boundaries of one employer. Judges have often
failed to see the self-interest involved and thus their enjoining such strikes is asking workers
to place more value on self-interest rather than on altruism. See id. at 106-11, 122-31.
45. Id. at 19.
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Collective bargaining's majoritarian bias and commitment to democratic
and egalitarian values thus necessitate some sacrifice of individual free-
dom.'
One important question is whether any of this history is still relevant
and should continue to shape our labor law. Proponents of labor-
management cooperation would argue that the new global marketplace
and the need to be internationally competitive mean the NLRA and the
traditional form of unions are destructive to the U.S. economy.4 It may
be that a law can age in such a way that its original purposes are no
longer useful and are even destructive." Whether tendencies toward
global marketplaces have indeed altered employer-employee relations to
such a degree that a new industrial relations paradigm is needed is a dif-
ficult question. At any rate, pleading for unions that will promote or at
least not harm company profits-rather than furthering worker inter-
ests-is an odd concern at a time when we have been experiencing both
record corporate profits and wages so severely depressed that some
workers qualify for food stamps. 9 Choosing the generation of profit as
the measure of a good labor law is also odd, given the state of society
today. Despite the increasing emphasis on economic issues, "goods can-
not be traded indefinitely in disregard of the fate of the people who
make them."' Ultimately commerce must be concerned with the well-
being of people and society."'
46. See HARRY WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 129, 189-98 (1968);
See also Zimarowski, supra note 25, at 54-55.
47. See Heckscher, supra note 8, at 7-8, 53-81; See Anna S. Rominger, Rethinking the
Paradigm: Can the Wagner Act and Labor-management Cooperation Coexist?, 8 DEPAUL
Bus. L.J. 159 (1996); but see Gould, supra note 3, at D24. Representative William Goodling
(R-Pa), chairman of the House Education and the Workforce Committee, said:
'It blows my mind that anybody could ever veto the TEAM Act,' . . . pointing to
the ever-growing global economy as an impetus for changing the National Labor
Relations Act. 'With the international competition as great as it is,' Goodling said,
'we can't keep going down the same path of confrontation, rather than coopera-
tion, between labor and management.'
Pamela M. Prah & Court Gifford, GOP Workplace Proposals Awaiting Completion When
Congress Returns, August 27, 1997, 166 DALY LAB. REP. (BNA), at D16.
48. See James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining and the Statutory
Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REv. 939 (1996).
49. See HOLLY SKLAR, CHAOS OR COMMUNrrY? SEEKINo SOLUTrIONS, NOT SCAPEGOATS
FOR BAD ECONOMICS (1995); see also Gould, supra hote 3, at D24.
50. Alain Supiot, Perspectives on Work: Introduction, 135 INT'L LAB. REV. 603, 603
(1996).
51. See Supiot supra note 50, at 603. Alain Supiot, Professor of Law and Social Policy
at the University of Nantes, observes that the experiences of many workers who face jobless-
ness and uselessness or overwork create something like a social death that threatens the very
foundations of human existence and reproduction (particularly lack of money or time to
bring up children). See id. This is bound to lead to violence because people cannot be recon-
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The ECA's advocates, primarily New Zealand employer groups,
such as the New Zealand Employers Federation (NZEF) and New Zea-
land Business Roundtable (NZBR), made arguments that tracked those
in support of a system based on labor-management cooperation as labor
law. 2 The NZBR and NZEF also claimed that unions create conflict in
the workplace and thus impede productivity, and that workers and em-
ployers were united in wanting to make the employer as profitable as
possible.53 These employer groups argued that once the old, conflict-
ridden system was eliminated, labor-management cooperation would
naturally come into existence since the highest priority for workers was
the same as for employers: the viability of the enterprise. 4 The NZBR
submission on the ECA argued that the existing system had ritualized
and institutionalized the supposed conflict that existed between employ-
ers and workers.5
Labor-management cooperation has also figured prominently in the
New Zealand employers associations' campaign for labor law reform.56
The NZEF claimed that the ECA would foster companies in which
"each employee is committed to a set of operational and personal ob-
jectives, through participation in the planning process."5 Workers would
be self-managing, individually fulfilled, problem solving team-workers,
who would work through "[s]taff associations, [which] where they exist
are strong and loyal""8 and facilitate the sensitive and rapid defusing of
controversy to obtain mutually satisfactory results. Management pro-
vides information freely and regularly and shares profit with the
workers, "after capital retention and dividend decisions have been
made"5 9 The NZEF contended that cooperation, equality and fairness
are the natural state for the workplace when there is no third party inter-
ference. The NZEF's handbook on employee involvement programs
ciled to social death indefinitely. Whether religious, criminal, or nationalist, violence will in
turn pose a threat to business and to the very survival of the market economy. The age of
simplistic arguments for labor deregulation (e.g. dismantle labour law and all will be best in
the best of all possible worlds) is drawing to a close and will have been short-lived.
52. See, e.g., Anne Knowles, Four Months Down the Track: Is the Employment Con-
tracts Act Working?, EXAMINER (N.Z.), Sept. 5, 1991, at 19; REPORT FROM THE ELECTRICITY
CORPORATION OF NEW ZEALAND TO THE LABOUR SELECT COMMITTEE OF NEW ZEALAND ON
SUBMISSIONS ON THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS BILL 10 (1991) (on file with author).
53. See iii
54. See id.
55. See NEW ZEALAND BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE (NZBR), SUBMISSION TO THE LABOUR
SELECT COMMrIrEE ON THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS BILL 1 (1991).
56. See, e.g., PENELOPE BROOK, FREEDOM AT WORK 17 (1990).





Cooperation, Conflict, or Coercion
states that "the effect of consultation should be to achieve the co-
operation of employees in... the implementation of management deci-
sions."O Conspicuously missing from this handbook statement is any
discussion of employees' having influence over workplace decisions and
any mention of bargaining.
The NZEF and NZBR contend that unions are inherently adversarial
and decry law that is "falsely 'based on the premise of an inherent on-
going conflict of interest between employers and workers,' which [is] a
'shibboleth and source of confusion.' ,6 The NZEF and NZBR argued
that New Zealand industrial relations legislation needed to be cleansed
of the idea that employer and employee interests conflicted. The NZEF
and NZBR's mutual goal was productivity; thus the interests of workers
and unions would be served by a closer identification with the em-
ployer.62 The NZEF and NZBR argued that employees' main concern is
that their employer makes a profit so it can continue to provide them
with jobs. This means, these employment associations contend, that em-
ployee and employer goals are so consistent that anything that interferes
with these common goals must be removed. 3
The NZEF and NZBR also claimed that conflict is a symptom of
pathology, of something gone awry in the natural state of employment
relations, which is an association of mutual gains, and argued that coop-
eration was the natural state of the workplace. Thus, conflict must mean
that some outside force, usually unions, has blinded the employer and
its employees to the unity of their natural interests." Anne Knowles,
NZEF Labour Market Manager, wrote: "[I]t is the equally firmly held
view of proponents of the [ECA] ... that divisions that have been cre-
ated in the workplace by outside constraints imposed by current
60. NZEF, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE NEW ZEALAND WORKPLACE: AN IN-
TRODUCTION AND GUIDE TO WORKER PARTICIPATION 35 (1977).
61. Ellen J. Dannin, Labor Law Reform in New Zealand, 13 N.Y.L. SC-. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 1, 30 (1992) (references omitted). This view has been developed by the organiza-
tional behaviorist school. It incorporated a focus on discovering techniques which would
secure "employee acceptance and cooperation in securing management's goals:' viewed
conflict as pathological, and management's goals as paramount. Kohler, supra note 27, at
516-17; see also GRENIER supra note 39, at xiv. Grenier found that the worker-participation
program he studied actually increased conflict between management and the workers and
among workers as part of a strategy to divide and conquer. I. at xix.
62. See NZBR CRITIQUE OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 2, NZBR SUBMISSION TO THE
LABOUR SELECT COMMrrrEE: THE LABOUR RELATIONS BILL 10 (1987) [hereinafter LRA
CRITIQUE].
63. See Anne Knowles, Employment Contracts Bill: What's in it For the Workers?
EXAMINER (NZ), Apr. 24, 1991, at 7; see also Peter Shirtcliffe, Chairperson of Telecom NZ,
Ltd., Address to the NZEF Convention 4-5 (May 13, 1992).
64. See Ellen Dannin, Solidarity Forever? Unions and Bargaining Representation Un-
der New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act, 18 LoY. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 4-7 (1995).
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legislation will be removed, allowing the employer and employees at an
enterprise to have full and open communication." " Electricity Corpora-
tion supported the enactment of the ECA because it believed that a
system, which gave the unions exclusive bargaining rights, led them to
advocate goals that bear no relationship to the real needs of employees
and employers.'
It was argued that the reforms proposed for New Zealand would
naturally improve both working conditions and the country's economy,
because they would promote a focus on business needs. Peter Shirtcliffe,
NZBR member and Chairperson of Telecom NZ, said: "Improved cus-
tomer satisfaction-giving people more of the goods and services they
need in better quality, at prices they can affrd-is the central objective
of deregulation: the force driving opportunity, innovation, business
growth, economic expansion, higher employment, higher wages, and
better social harmony for the future."67 Unions would exist in a system
controlled by economic outcomes: "The bottom-line test of the per-
formance of any employment relations system is a simple one : [sic] is it
achieving high levels of employment and high levels of productivity
growth?" 68
New Zealand employer groups also advocated the importance of
enterprise bargaining in their campaign to replace the existing multi-
employer bargaining system." The New Zealand employer groups advo-
cated enterprise unionism as a means to improve performance by
moderating worker wage demands:
Union representatives argued against the formation of enterprise
unions.., on the grounds that "sweetheart" unions would de-
velop and disruptive inter-union rivalry would occur. The self-
interested and empty nature of these claims is illustrated by the
following observations on the harmonious and highly produc-
tive Japanese industrial relations system from a member of the
United States Council of Economic Advisers:
'Why do Japanese unions allow a degree of flexibility that
would be an anathema to American unions? The reason: they
are organised companywide rather than industrywide. Because
national unions in Japan rarely control locals' policies, a single
65. Knowles, supra note 63, at 7.
66. See Electricity Corporation, supra note 54, at 5.
67. Shirtcliffe, supra note 63, at 4-5.
68. NZBR, REvIEw OF THE OPERATION OF THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT IN THE 1988/89
WAGE ROuND 15 (1989).
69. See Dannin, supra note 61, at 20-24.
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industry contains several different "enterprise unions" as they
are called, and these unions compete with one another. Workers
will moderate wage demands rather than jeopardise their firm's
market share.'70
New Zealand employer associations also argued that unions should
be transformed by focusing on providing services to prospective mem-
bers and competing with one another on that basis.7 These employer
associations contended: "Thorough reform of the system, including
breaking down barriers to competition, will transform unions in much
the same way that the deregulation of product markets has transformed
business in New Zealand and made it more productive and responsive to
consumers"" Unions were to exist in a system controlled by economic
outcomes:
Trade unions reflect the need to have associations in many cir-
cumstances, not least to minimise the costs of negotiating and
enforcing agreements. They can also provide valued services to
members. What is at issue is the form of many unions, which is
often divorced from the common interests of a workplace, and
the lack of effectiveness stemming from protected positions.
Unionization should not be forced on groups in the economy
where such arrangements are not relevant. But in an environ-
ment where unions were free to adapt their structures and
compete for the provision of services, their vitality, responsive-
ness and democratic accountability to members could only be
enhanced."
Thus, not only did New Zealand groups which advocated changes in
their labor law promote a system of labor-management cooperation,
many of their arguments and analyses bore a strong resemblance to
those now being advanced in support of basing U.S. labor law on labor-
management cooperation.
B. Allowing Employers to Choose the Form of Unionization
Among those who promote labor-management cooperation are those
who also advocate giving an employer the power to choose the union
that will represent its employees in order to promote the use of labor-
70. LRA CRrTIQuE, supra note 62, at 9-10.
71. See Dannin, supra note 61, at 12-17.
72. Ronald Trotter, New Zealand Labour Market Reform: Class Struggle or Productivity
Struggle?, in NZBR, LABOUR MARKETS AND EMPLOYMENr: NZBR STATEMENTS ON
LABOUR RELATIONS 10 (1988).
73. See Trotter, supra note 72, at 9.
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management cooperation.74 Achieving this requires altering NLRA
§ 8(a)(2),' which proscribes employer assistance to or domination of a
labor organization, which Republican Congressional representatives 7'
and employer organizations, such as the Labor Policy Association, have
long advocated.' One argument made for permitting this is to:
create incentives for unions to alter their 'product'-to emphasize
the contributions they can make in communicating employee
preferences, promoting employee commitment and trust, and ne-
gotiating what the economists call 'collective goods' (terms, like a
grievance procedure, that are desired by the workers as a group
but are not efficiently provided to individuals). 8
These proposals harken back to conditions before the NLRA was
enacted. Employers were then free to recognize any union and could
impose upon employees a "representative" not chosen by the employ-
ees. 9 The NLRA rejected this and gave employees freedom to choose
their own representative by majority vote-that is, by a process com-
monly felt to be a legitimate one for making collective decisions in the
United States. In doing so, the NLRA orders employers not to resist
unionism and vests the decision as to representation solely with em-
ployees.'o Thirty years ago, Harry Wellington observed that even flawed
unions do more to protect workers' economic interests and political de-
mocracy than do no unions, but only as long as "the union is not a tool
of the state or the employer."'" The NLRA is founded upon this princi-
ple.
74. Estreicher, supra note 8, at 834-41.
75. See, Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Mar-
kets, 69 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 3, 22-27 (1993).
76. See TEAM Act, supra note 5. On February 10, 1997, Senate Republicans introduced
the Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1997 (TEAM). The bill would amend the
NLRA to allow labor-management teams currently prohibited by NLRA 08(a)(2)).
77. See, As TEAM Act Moves Through Congress, Employers Pursue Employee Involve-
ment, supra note 5, at 255; see, e.g., NAM Offers Agenda for Helping Workers That Stresses
Worker Involvement of TEAM, supra note 5, at 229; Estreicher, supra note 75, at 22 n.66.
In a detailed study of NLRB cases from 1972 to 1993, James Rundle found little evi-
dence that supported the claims employers advanced in support of their need to repeal
§ 8(a)(2). James R. Rundle, The Debate over the Ban on Employer-Dominated Labor Or-
ganizations: What Is the Evidence?, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW,
supra note 32, at 161.
78. Estreicher, supra note 9, at E-10.
79. GREGORY & KATZ, supra note 21, at 227.
80. See id. at 224.
81. Wellington, supra note 46, at 187(quoting SEYMOUR LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN 430
n.10 (1963)). One measure of the viability of such a system could be based on current expe-
rience with employer-established grievance procedures in nonunion settings. If they are
simply a rubber stamp of managerial decisions, this suggests little employee bargaining
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New Zealand employer associations also argued that an employer
must have final control over the form and number of employment con-
tracts in its workplace. 2 Employer control might not seem offensive to
those who believe that workers and employer interests are one, although
such control seems to place little faith in the workers' ability to demon-
strate the unity of these interests. The ECA permits employers to
recognize and deal with unions that no employee has selected as a rep-
resentative. 3
C. Employees Prefer Labor-Management Cooperation
Some argue that U.S. employees are not joining unions because the
analysts prefer less adversarial forms of representation." Thus, these
employees would argue, the reason unions have declined is that they are
adversarial and for this reason cannot attract new members. A labor re-
lations system based in labor-management cooperation would increase
union density. Recently, a Freeman-Rogers poll found that workers pre-
fer to elicit management cooperation by being represented by an
organization jointly run by employees and management and fully: fi-
nanced by management."
This polling data, while intriguing, is not, however, a sufficient basis
for deciding how to construct a labor relations system. Basically, the
employee responses reflect little more than a snapshot of worker reac-
tions. They cannot fairly be taken as demonstrating what worker views
power and little interest on the part of management in paying attention to employee interests.
In Joseph Gentile's experience with Northrup, its management appeals committee overturned
or modified sixty percent of the grievance decisions that came before it. This, however, can-
not be regarded as representative of all such programs since Northrup's program is not
widely used and provided many special checks to ensure fairness. See Joseph Gentile, The
Structure and Working of Employer-Promulgated Grievance Procedures, in LABOR AR-
BITRATION UNDER FIRE 136, 147-53 (James Stern & Joyce Najita eds., 1997).
82. See Parl. Deb. (Hansard) 1425 (1991).
83. See Dannin, supra note 64, at 44-46.
84. See Heckscher, supra note 8, at 53, 62-71.
85. See RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, THE WORKER REPRESENTATION AND
PARTICIPATION SURVEY: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN EMPLOYEES (1994). Rogers
himself promotes what he calls a "high-road alternative" which includes promoting:
nearly continuous innovation and productivity growth among firms and the sub-
stitution of quality-based competitive strategies for price-based ones. High road
restructuring is associated with better industrial relations, higher levels of worker
involvement, a more democratic workplace, higher productivity and pay, vastly re-
duced environmental damage, and greater firm commitment to the health and
stability of surrounding human communities-all happy outcomes for workers and
American society in general, all immensely preferable to the low road alternative
of sweated workers, economic insecurity, rising inequality, and degraded natural
environments.
Wade Rathke & Joel Rogers, A Strategy for Labor, DISSENT, Fall 1996, at 78, 79.
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are for all times under all conditions. Different responses would be
likely if workers were asked the same questions at a time when they
were actually choosing to unionize or if they were subjected to the sort
of stresses that motivate workers who to attempt to organize. 6 Indeed,
the results cannot be read without considering evidence of the current
high level of expressed employer hostility to unionization." It seems
likely that this employer hostility would squelch the possibility of mak-
ing any accurate measurement of employees' desires as to unionization.
Furthermore, studies suggest that the decision to unionize is subject
to change based on workers' level of familiarity with unions and per-
ception of unions as effective in attaining workers' goals.' s In addition,
other polls show that unorganized workers' desire to unionize far ex-
ceeds their rate of unionization, suggesting that other factors than
employee desire play a role in the outcome.89
Thus, views captured in an opinion poll may reflect no more than
transitory preferences founded in uncertainty about economic conditions
in a time of union decline. Without some reason to believe that the
Freeman-Rogers poll has tapped into stable, fundamental values, this
poll is a thin reed upon which to propose fundamental labor law reform.
II. NEW ZEALAND'S EXPERIENCE WITH A LABOR-MANAGEMENT
COOPERATION REGIME
A. Are the United States and New Zealand Comparable?
The discussion to this point demonstrates that arguments currently
being advanced for U.S. labor law reform strongly resemble those made
in support of the ECA. That similarity, however, may not mean that New
Zealand's experience under the ECA can shed light on how such a sys-
tem would operate in the United States. To the degree that there is a
close fit between the United States and New Zealand on relevant points
we can say with confidence that New Zealand's experience is suffi-
86. See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 WiS. L.
REV. 379, 393 n.28 (1983) (listing inappropriate uses of polling data).
87. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 34; Bronfenbrenner, supra note 32, at 75; Bronfen-
brenner & Juravich, supra note 32.
88. See Thomas Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues,
36 B.C. L. REV. 279, 283-84 (1995); Hoyt Wheeler & John McClendon, The Individual
Desire to Unionize, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS 47, 62-63 (George Strauss, et al., eds.,
1991).
89. See Ronald Seeber, Trade Union Growth and Decline: The Movement and the Indi-
vidual, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS, supra note 88, at 93, 99; see also Atleson, supra note
27, at 477, 486-88.
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ciently comparable to permit generalization to the United States and that
the results are applicable to the United States.
There are strong similarities between the two countries on many
relevant factors. Both are developed, industrialized countries and have a
strong mix of industrial, service, and agricultural sectors. Both countries
have had a long history of legalized collective bargaining, and, although
they are not identical, both systems of collective bargaining share cer-
tain basic principles and modes of operation. Both countries are the
heirs of the common law system and thus apply similar bodies of law
and concepts, including common law employment law concepts. Fur-
thermore, both share common histories and cultures as former colonies
of Britain with indigenous peoples, and immigration has since led to
mixed cultures and communities. Finally, both are democracies with
educated, literate populations.' These factors are important in affecting
the way people are likely to work and interact with one another and with
the law.
Pre-ECA New Zealand unions strongly resembled certain aspects of
U.S. unions. Paul Weiler suggests that while it is possible to view U.S.
unionization as an activity of employees, U.S. unions are more often
perceived as an entity external to employees, as "a large, bureaucratic
organization whose full-term officials periodically negotiate a long-term
contract behind closed doors with the employer, and then represent a
fairly small number of employees who are aggrieved by the way man-
agement administers the contract during its lifetime."9' Weiler also
describes unions that have paid little attention to the felt needs of those
they represent.9 As a result, rather than being a collective of employees,
U.S. unions may often be seen as professional organizations similar to
an employer's personnel department.93 This was certainly true of those
New Zealand unions which had little direct involvement in the lives of
workers as the unions' most important role shrank to negotiating con-
tract terms and prosecuting personal grievances when those terms were
violated.94
90. See generally JOHN DEEKS ET AL., LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN NEW
ZEALAND (2d ed. 1994); ALAN GEARE, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION
AND THE NEW ZEALAND SYSTEM (3d ed. 1995); see generally, ELLEN J. DANNIN, WORKING
FREE: THE ORIGINS AND IMPACT OF NEw ZEALAND'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTs ACr
(1997). I also make these generalizations as one who has lived for extended periods in both
countries.
91. WEILER, supra note 5, at 11-12.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. For a more detailed description of unions in this period, see generally, Ellen J. Dan-
nin, We Can't Overcome? A Case Study of Freedom of Contract and Labor Law Reform, 14
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 1-87 (1995),
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Furthermore, beginning in the 1980s New Zealand has undergone a
major reorientation in its perception of unemployment and individual
and social responsibility that resembles that which occurred in the United
States under President Ronald Reagan as part of "Reaganomics." In
New Zealand these changes have come about as a consequence of and
coincident with policies of Finance Minister Roger Douglas which have
come to be known as "Rogernomics." In fact, the name "Rogernomics"
was consciously modeled on "Reaganomics."' As in the United States,"
the changes which grew out of the materialism experienced during the
prosperous first years under "Rogernomics" contributed to this shift in
public views. In the past, most New Zealanders would have supported a
philosophy that said full employment was an important component of a
functional democracy because full employment removes servility and
balances power. Through the two generations that grew up after the
Great Depression, the New Zealand government made full employment
its goal and spent large amounts of money to create employment or
works schemes.' In the 1990s, however, unemployment was displaced
as the government's top economic priority. Rather, the rights of con-
sumers and investors to maximum freedom of action became the
paramount interest.98
Furthermore, the legal environment during the ECA's existence
strongly resembles that in the United States today. The ECA's partner
legislation, the Economic and Social Initiative, made major cuts in most
areas of social welfare benefits.9 These cuts were designed to force
people to accept work under any conditions offered. It did this, first, by
limiting those entitled to receive welfare benefits.'00 Second, the legisla-
tion lowered wages payable to large segments of the unemployed
95. See Colin James, Overview, in ROGERNOMICS: RESHAPING NEW ZEALAND'S
ECONOMY 1, 3 (Simon Walker ed., 1989).
96. The U.S. has experienced high official unemployment which has also kept wages
from rising and has resulted in wage declines from twenty to forty percent. The real unem-
ployment rate is much higher; at least one-third of the workforce is looking for more work
than it has. Furthermore, the past two decades has seen a delinking of productivity gains and
wage increases. See Lester Thurow, The Crusade That's Killing Prosperity, in TICKING TIME
BOMBS: THE NEW CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY 48, 50-51 (Robert Kuttner ed.,
1996); Lawrence Mishel, Rising lides, Sinking Wages in TICKING TIME BOMBS: THE NEW
CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY at 81, 81-84.; KORTEN, supra note 32, at 19, 22,
37-50.
97. See DAVID THOMSON, SELFISH GENERATIONS? THE AGING OF NEW ZEALAND'S
WELFARE STATE 69-70 (1991).
98. See JANE KELSEY, ROLLING BACK THE STATE: PRIVATISATION OF POWER IN
AOTEAROA/NEW ZEALAND 78-79, 83 (1994); see generally, THOMSON, supra note 97.
99. See Finance Bill § 15(3); see also Patricia Herbert, Stripping Away Workers' Protec-
tion, THE DOMINION (N.Z.), Feb. 20, 1991, at 14.
100. See id.
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workforce. This included a youth subminimum wage which could be
paid to age twenty.' Third, welfare benefits were lowered so drastically
that few could survive on them.' °
This program reflected a new view, one at odds with New Zealand's
socialist past, that poverty is a sign of a weak character, that the well off
have no responsibility to the poor, and that such requirements, in a time
when the opportunity to work is limited, are not inhumane or unrealis-
tic.103
There are, of course, differences between the two countries. The
United States is larger geographically, economically, and demographi-
cally than is New Zealand. U.S. unions are larger and more numerous
than their New Zealand union counterparts, although overall union or-
ganization tends to match, reflecting the similar breakdowns of jobs and
industries. The United States is not physically isolated from other coun-
tries as is New Zealand. Pre-ECA New Zealand had a much higher
union density'o than did the United States; an industrial relations system
more supportive of unions than is the United States; and a society that
had a long tradition of being more friendly to socialized answers to
problems.
Although all these differences might be important in another con-
text, there is nothing about any of these factors that means the New
101. See Finance Bill § 34, Schedule (1990); see also Colin James, Stay Tuned In-
There's a Lot More Drama, NAT'L Bus. REV., Dec. 21, 1990 at 10.
102. See Herbert, supra note 100, at 14. Of this package, New Zealand economist Brian
Easton comments:
Thus the substantial reductions in unemployment benefits-some of the cuts were
over twenty percent-plus harsher entitlement conditions, were intended to rein-
force the changes in industrial law, by keeping unskilled wage rates lower, and-it
was hoped-so generating extra jobs. Unfortunately the fiscal impact of the pack-
age, involving substantial reductions in social welfare spending, collapsed a
fragile economy into its sharpest post-war contraction, so the harsher welfare
measures and the changes in the industrial relations law, compounded the social
pressures of an economic downturn.
Brian Easton, Economist, Letter to Ellen J. Dannin 1-2 (Mar. 27, 1994) (on file with author).
103. See EDMUND BYRNE, WORK, INC: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 65 (1990).
104. Estimates vary; however, it is clear that New Zealand had high actual and com-
parative union density. Various studies show it with forty-two percent membership in 1988.
See Richard Freeman & Joel Rogers, Who Speaks for Us? Employee Representation in a
Nonunion Labor Market, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND FUTURE DI-
RECTIONS 13, 16 (Bruce Kaufman & Morris Kleiner, eds. 1993). 1985 New Zealand
Department of Labour estimates show union density at sixty-five percent on the eve of the
ECA in May 1991. See Raymond Harbridge & Kevin Hince, Organising Workers: The Ef-
fects of the Act on Union Membership and Organisation, in EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: NEW
ZEALAND EXPERIENCES 224, 226, 228 (Raymond Harbridge, ed. 1993); see also Nigel Ha-
worth, Unions in Crisis: Deregulation and Reform of the New Zealand Union Movement, in
ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF TRADE
UNIONISM IN NINE COUNTRIES 282, 286-87 (Stephen Frenkel, ed. 1993).
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Zealand experience cannot fairly be generalized to the United States. If
anything, New Zealand's smaller scope and relative isolation is an ad-
vantage because it facilitates the tracing of events and causation.
Furthermore, as will be discussed, the events that have occurred under
the ECA actually have greater significance for the United States pre-
cisely because New Zealand had been so much more supportive of
unions.
In sum, it is fair to generalize from the ECA experience to the likely
operation of the current program of reforms associated with labor-
management cooperation.
B. The Employment Contracts Act (ECA) in the Laboratory
The ECA created a flexible scheme for bargaining within the ideo-
logical framework of at-will contracting. The ECA was intended to
change the way workplace conditions were set and to move bargaining
from New Zealand's century-old system based on multi-employer bar-
gaining, which set terms on an occupational basis across employers, to
bargaining on an enterprise or single-employer basis.'05 Examining how
the ECA has played out over its six years of existence provides intrigu-
ing evidence as to how similar reforms would operate in the United
States. The balance of this article assesses the ECA's operations in terms
of the role unions are playing in promoting an employer's enterprise:
whether New Zealand unions have come to focus more on improving
employer productivity; whether union density has increased; whether
employers and employees have preferred cooperative or value-added
unions over traditional adversarial unions; and whether the'reforms have
had a positive impact upon productivity and society.
Indeed, within its first year, fundamental changes were already tak-
ing place. The most basic of these changes was a shift from multi-
employer agreements to enterprise agreements. As early as 1992 and
certainly by 1993, that is, within two years, there had been a dramatic
move away from the previously dominant multi-employer agreements
(awards)'06 to enterprise agreements--either based on collective em-
ployment contracts (CECs), individual employment contracts (IECs), or
no formal contract. Indeed, within two years, multi-employer agree-
ments had declined from fifty-nine percent of all agreements to only six
percent.
105. See generally Dannin, supra note 94 for an exploration of the ECA's genesis and
drafting. Its impact is explored at length in Dannin, supra note 90.
106. -Awards are described in more detail. See infra text, at nn. 189-205.
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CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT STRUCTURES: 1991-1993'0
Type of Coverage 1991 1992 1993
Award/lMultiemployer CEC* 59% 9% 6%
Single Enterprise CEC 13% 35% 35%
IECs* .10% 36% 37%
Combination IEC & CEC 0% 5% 8%
No Formal Contracts 18% 16% 14%
• Collective Employment Contracts
* Includes contracts negotiated individually, informal contracts-those not
actually negotiated-and those which the law recognized as contracts,
such as contracts based on the terms of expired awards of agreements.
The changes have continued as the contract form continues to de-
volve toward IECs as the dominant form. By 1996, forty-five percent of
employers surveyed had IECs as the predominant contract form.1°8
There were also early claims that the ECA has made bargaining less
adversarial. Gavin Fitzgerald of the Manufacturers Industrial Relations
Service Ltd., for example, wrote that by 1992, that is within one year, he
had already "formulated 1447 contracts under the new Act.''l 9 He said
that the process had taken an average of three months and had resulted
in an atmosphere of trust and commonality of interest because the phi-
losophy of the ECA was that "employer and employees must get their
heads together, removed from the influence of third parties, and agree
jointly how best to make the enterprise prosper to the benefit of both
investors and employees."" °
The first six years of the ECA has been a dramatic period of union
restructuring through splits, amalgamations, and dissolutions. Most of
these events are brought about as workers shift their support and their
authorizations to represent from one union to another. This change of
representation is easily done, since the law imposes no restrictions of
freedom of choice and freedom of association."' In May 1991, five per-
107. See Richard Whatman et al., Labour Market Adjustment under the Employment
Contracts Act, 19 N.Z. J. IND REL. 53,56 (1994).
108. See John Savage, What Do We Know about the Economic Impacts of the ECA?
N.Z. Institute of Economic Research (Inc.), May 15, 1996, at 14.
109. Gavin Fitzgerald, Does the Medicine Work?, MANUFACTURER, Aug. 1992, at 8
(emphasis added).
110. See id.
111. See BRIAN EASTON, THE COMMERCIALISATION OF NEw ZEALAND 127-31 (1997);
see generally, Interview with Graeme Clarke, General Secretary Manufacturing and Con-
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cent of New Zealand unions had fewer than one thousand members."'
By December 1995, forty-six percent of unions had one thousand or
fewer members."' Thus, one effect of such a regime has been more and
smaller unions.
Those union splits, which often reflect ideological and strategic dif-
ferences, have resulted in two umbrella organizations, each of which
effectively embodies one of the two union models: the cooperative or
value-added unionism and traditional or adversarial unionism."4 The
value-added model is found within the New Zealand Council of Trade
Unions (CTU). At the time of the ECA's enactment, the CTU was the
sole umbrella organization. The CTU was formed in 1987 when the
Federation of Labor (the private sector umbrella organization), the state
sector unions, and some previously unaffiliated unions combined."' In
1991, sixty-five percent of all New Zealand unions representing eighty-
seven percent of all union members were affiliated with the CTU."
6
The second umbrella organization, the Trade Union Federation
(TUF), was formed May 1, 1993, largely from groups disaffected with
the CTU's focus."7 The name was chosen for its acronym because its
membership wanted the organization to be tough."' The TUF conforms
to a model of traditional or adversarial unionism. According to its then
general secretary, Maxine Gay:
Since its formation the TUF has acted both as a trade union
centre in its own right and also as a ginger group inside the
trade union movement as a whole. The TUF represents 13 un-
ions with a total of 30,000 members, about one-tenth the size of
struction Workers Union, in Wellington (July 28, 1997) [hereinafter Clarke Interview]; Inter-
view with Maxine Gay & Graeme Clark, in Wellington, New Zealand (June 17, 1996)
[hereinafter Gay & Clark Interview]. For a description of the mechanisms of these splits, see
Dannin, supra note 90; Dannin, supra note 64, at 22-33, 54-60.
112. See Aaron Crawford, et al., Unions and Union Membership in New Zealand: An-
nual Review for 1995, 21 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 188, 190 (1996).
113. Seeid.
114. For the details of how these two umbrella organizations have behaved are set out
below, see infra text, at nn. 111-32. To a large extent this split reflected a rift between the
New Zealand Communist Party and the Socialist Unity Party. The CPNZ has long regarded
the SUP- affiliated Council of Trade Unions (CTU) as an advocate of "class collaborationist
unionism." Chris Trotter, Mysterious Ways, METRo, Feb. 1994, at 130.
115. See Owen Harvey, The Unions and the Government: The Rise and Fall of the
Compact, in CONTROLLING INTERESTS: BusINESs, THE STATE AND SOCIETY IN NEW
ZEALAND 59, 64 (John Decks & Nick Perry eds., 1992).
116. See Raymond Harbridge & Kevin Hince, Unions and Union Membership in New
Zealand 1985-1992, 18 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 352, 358 (1993).
117. See Herbert Roth, Chronicle, 18 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 264, 267; See also Sarah
Boyd, Unionism Finds New Ways in Fight to Survive, EVENING POST (N.Z.), Sept. 8, 1993, at
7; Unions to Form New Federation, PRESS (N.Z.), Dec. 12, 1992, at 1.
118. See Gay & Clark Interview, supra note 111.
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the larger centre [the CTU]. In the short time of its existence the
TUF has been able to play a significant role in pulling the trade
union movement as a whole to a more left/ activist orientation
or, where it has not achieved this, forcefully pointing out that
there is another trade union view to the dominant one." 9
The way these two union movements and one key affiliate union
within each of them have performed provides valuable insights into
many aspects of proposals for labor-management cooperation in the
United States. Although New Zealand is a small country in terms of
population, its union movement is as complex as in any country. Cer-
tainly not all unions that have retained their CTU membership conform
to all its aims. Within the CTU the affiliate union which has best em-
bodied its model of unionism is its largest affiliated union, the New
Zealand Engineering, Printing & Manufacturing Union (Engineers).'o
Within the TUF its main affiliate, the Manufacturing and Construction
Workers Union (MCWU) is an exemplar of the TUF's underlying phi-
losophy.'
The ECA has exacerbated the pre-existing inter-union conflict be-
cause the ECA has allowed unions a wide ambit to define themselves, to
take new forms and to become more aggressive in pursuing their own
visions. The Engineers view the MCWU as radical, confrontational, and
unrealistic; while the MCWU sees the Engineers as a business union-
not a real union-and as willing to do deals with employers at the ex-
pense of workers." At times, the MCWU and Engineers have worked
together, for example, in negotiations at Honda, Mitsubishi, and other
119. Maxine Gay, Speech Notes: Search Foundation Seminar: Brisbane (May 19, 1996)
(on file with author).
120. The Engineers has historically been made up of automobile workers and metal
trades workers. It has been the largest private sector union in New Zealand during most of
the ECA era with about 40,000 members, depending on industry performance and amalga-
mations. It has expanded its ambit through outright mergers with other unions or by
soliciting individual workers so that it now represents far more classifications than before the
ECA. See RAYMOND HARBRIDGE & KEvIN HINCE, A SOURCEBOOK OF NEw ZEALAND
TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ORGANISATIONS 36 (1994). On April 1, 1996, the Engineers
merged with the Printing, Packaging and Media Union to cover fourteen industries and grew
to 60,000 members. See Birth of a Super Union, METAL, June 1996 at 1.
121. The Manufacturing and Construction Workers Union (MCWU) represents workers
in diverse industries and locations as a consequence of its having gone through a series of
amalgamations between 1987 and 1991.
122. For a detailed description of their relations, see Dannin, supra note 94, at 27-33,
36-38.
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sites where both have members.'3 However, most of the time these
groups have opposed one another in tactics, ideals, and actions.
The ways in which the CTU, TUF, Engineers, and MCWU have in-
teracted on key issues provides insights as to how a labor-management
regime would function in the United States.
1. Union Focus on Productivity Issues
One key argument advanced for labor-management cooperation is
that it would improve productivity by defusing an adversarial atmos-
phere and encouraging a focus on the employer's bottomline. This issue
has been important within New Zealand, and the different union organi-
zations have taken opposing positions on it.
a. The CTU-Engineers Views
The CTU and Engineers Union have tried to use the increased scope
of bargaining under the ECA to put new issues on the table. The Engi-
neers believe that unions exist mainly to negotiate better wages and
terms of employment.'2 However, much of its literature, as well as that
of the CTU, suggests that its main focus has been on improving man-
agement practices in order to promote productivity and, as a result,
improve wages and other working conditions.' 2
The Engineers says it has altered its bargaining strategy to fit the
goals of progressive employers by pursuing contracts that focus on an
industry or an enterprise, providing career paths by rewarding skill de-
velopment, and promoting workplace reform and cooperation "to jointly
manage the process of change"', 26 The Engineers see being simply a
bargaining agent as a narrow role; as the Engineers also prefer to par-
ticipate in decisions on training at the industry and workplace level.'
The CTU echoes this. Its prescription for "a fairer industrial rela-
tions system" includes:
123. See, e.g., Works Committee Abandoned, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Dec. 1995, at 5;
Growing Unity Stems Employer, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Sept. 1995, at 4; Clarke Interview,
supra note 111.
124. See OWEN HARVEY, TOWARDS A UNION STRATEGY FOR THE 1990'S 13 (1988).
125. Not so far under the surface of its proposals was the judgment that employers, if
left to themselves, could not properly manage their own workplaces and would trade off
long-term social needs for short-term gains. Haworth, supra note 104, at 282, 297.
126. MARTIN PERRY, FT AL, REFORM AT WORK: WORKPLACE CHANGE AND THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL ORDER 56 (1995).
127. See Rosalie Webster, "Give Us Dignity," POLITICAL REVIEW, Sept./Oct. 1993, at
15; see also PETER ENDERWICK, INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN NEW ZEALAND: A REVIEW OF THE
ISSUES: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE NEW ZEALAND ENGINEERING UNION AND THE NEW
ZEALAND PRINTING AND RELATED TRADES UNION (1993).
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Protection for the vulnerable, the out of work and the work
seekers,
-Improved rights and bargaining processes,
* A wider scope of bargaining so that effective collective
agreements can be negotiated with more than one enterprise,
The establishment of industry development organisations
through which all interest groups-the government, and
workers and their unions as well as the companies-can
negotiate,
* Involvement in broader economic and social policies for
workers and unions,
* Emphasising economic growth with equity, developed in a
participatory way, and
A national code of basic rights and protections.'
Both the CTU and Engineers see failing to participate in macro-
economic decisionmaking as consigning "unions to a reactive role in an
environment outside their influence."' 9 CTU president, Ken Douglas,
urges unions to take on a role to ensure a "quality economy with a role
for unions within it."' He believes: "It was because the old industrial
order did not deliver the quality economy that it could be knocked over
without fear for its economic consequences.' 3 Douglas argues that the
128. See NEw ZEALAND CoUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS (CTU), A QUALITY FuTuRE:
WORKING TOGETHER FOR GROWTH IN NEw ZEALAND 14 (1992) (hereinafter QUALITY
FUTURE]. This corresponds to some degree to the program advanced by Wade Rathke and
Joel Rogers. Rathke & Rogers, supra note 85, at 79-80.They argue that unions should help
capital by providing "a trained and motivated labor force, capable of sustaining the require-
ments of continuous innovation"; "redesigned labor-market institutions providing clear
labor-market signals to incumbent workers and new entrants"; minimum working standards
with the elimination of government subsidies to "low-roading firms"; promotion of labor-
management cooperation and flexibility to capture employees' full productive potential;
rapid diffusion of technology and "high-performance forms of work organization." Id.
129. HARVEY, supra note 124, at 20.
130. Ken Douglas, The Political Economy of the Employment Contracts Act, 13 RACE
GENDER CLASS 10, 11 (1992).
131. Id., at 12. Of course, it can be argued that the old industrial order did deliver a
quality economy, but the loss of Britain as a customer once it joined the European Economic
Community was what harmed unions.
It can also be argued, as Douglas does, that one role unions need to play is that of help-
ing capitalism by solving problems individual firms are unable to resolve.
Unions use their reach in the economy, their political power in the state, and the
interests of their members to force capital to do something good for it-
self.... [C]apitalism... left to its own squabbling devices is ever more ruinous to
our health. In response to increased competitive pressures, most U.S. firms have
responded with 'low-road' competitive strategies geared more to price reduction
than quality improvement-strategies that have led to falling wages and rising
inequality.
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new unionism must be based on what unions support, rather than what
they oppose:
We can oppose the introduction of a new technology. That is
protesting against it. Or we can negotiate the work design and
skills recognition that goes with it to gain the benefits of en-
hanced job security. That is mobilising around change.... What
I am trying to convey is the need to get away from the mindset
that sees union action as sufficient in the carrying of banners.
The key question is what happens next. What we can get the
government or the boss to do, not what we can stop them from
doing.
3 1
The key to making a "contribution as a union movement to the goal
of a fully employed, high skilled, high wage economy" in the CTU's
view is unions playing a role in training, technological change, and in-
dustrial policy.' 3 The CTU advocates that unions have an industry focus,
meaning that unions should view:
things from an industry outlook. At the macro level this means
being concerned about and planning for the development and
betterment of that industry. It means using one's resources at a
Governmental and increasingly international level. It means
commitment of resources (plans and staff) with employers or-
ganisations, industry organisations, training organisations and
having a view on the monetary and fiscal policies that may ef-
fect that industry."
The CTU says that industry bargaining would be "more a conse-
quence of attitude and approach than of structure, evolutionary both in
coverage and in its depth, an aspect of the wider development path of
the industry."' 3 Industry bargaining would focus on research and devel-
opment expenditures and allocation of funds; joint ventures between
industry and government on technological development; assessment of
industry infrastructure supply needs; market development assistance
programmes; coordination of marketing; trade access negotiations;
skills needs assessment and labour supply projections; the establishment
Rathke & Rogers, supra note 85, at 79.
132. Jonathan Milne, Has Ken Douglas Gone Soft?, PSA J., Nov. 1991, at 4.
133. See QUALITY FUTURE, supra note 128, at 18.
134. CTU, WELL-RESOURCED, EFFICIENT, INDUSTRY FOCUSED UNIONS: A NEW
ZEALAND COUNCIL OF TRADE UNIONS VIEW ON THE ISSUES UNIONS NEED TO CONSIDER TO
COPE wrrH THE DEMANDS OF TODAY'S ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTS,
7 (1995) [hereinafter WELL-RESOURCED EFFICIENT, INDUSTRY FOCUSED UNIONS].
135. QUALITY FUTURE, supra note 128, at 19.
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of quality standards and quality control procedures; establishing and
monitoring health and hygiene regulations and industry codes for occu-
pational health and safety; and assistance with workplace reform, team
work initiatives, and gainsharing payments systems 36
b. The TUF-MCWU View
Implicit in the CTU-Engineers' position is an assumption that a un-
ion cannot be a vigorous representative of employee interests or
negotiate important issues of the day, such as how technology is to be
introduced, if it maintains a focus separate from that of the employer.
The TUF and MCWU would argue, however, that this assumption cre-
ates a false dichotomy. Their view that traditional unionism can and has
successfully accommodated negotiations on such subjects has empirical
support.'37 Although it is commonly believed that job-control unionism
makes it impossible to introduce new technology, systematic studies
since 1926 show that "willing acceptance is the most common Ameri-
can union response to technological change.... [I]n most cases, unions
welcome technological modernization; sometimes encouraging it, most
often accepting it, infrequently opposing it, but usually seeking to pro-
tect their members."' 3 This is precisely the stance taken by the TUF and
MCWU.
In 1996, the MCWU formally resolved that it would maintain a
point of view independent of employers and political parties.'39 At the
same time, it established a Solidarity Fund to be used to strengthen soli-
darity inside and outside the union, to assist in recruiting and organizing
new members, and to support members involved in long-term dis-
putes."" The MCWU affirmed that organizing is a priority and pledged
136. See id., at 20; NEW ZEALAND ENGINEERING UNION, INC., WORKPLACE AUS-
TRALIA: THE NEw ZEALAND LINK (1991); Preview Demonstration Project, WORKREFORM:
THE NEWSLETrER FOR WORKPLACE NEw ZEALAND, Sept. 1992, at 1; Patricia Herbert, Rip-
ples of Change for the Workplace, THE DOMINION (N.Z.), Nov. 3, 1992, at 6. The Public
Service Association (PSA) is also interested in having an industrial strategy which would
include "'the delivery of effective and efficient public services." Industrial Strategy: Taking
A Broader View, PSA J., Feb. 1992, at 8.
The Communist Party, a group with which the MCWU was aligned, opposed Workplace
New Zealand, a key forum for promoting expanded bargaining, as "Fordism taken to its logi-
cal conclusion of total control by the employer:' Graeme Clarke, Reform Secures Employer
Control, LABOUR NoTEs, Sept. 1992, at 8; see also Workplace New Zealand: Designing the
Future, METAL, Oct. 1992, at 5.
137. Jeffrey Keefe, Do Unions Hinder Technological Change?, in Mishel & Voos, su-
pra note 28, at 109, 123-24.
138. See id.
139. See Growth to Be Promoted, M & C WORKERS NEws, June 1996, at 6, 7.
140. See Fund Established, M & C WORKERs NEWS, June 1996, at 6.
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to use funds from any new members to fund organizing. '14 Most funda-
mentally, the MCWU believes that a union's job is "to run into the
employer's vaults and take out as much money for the workers as possi-
ble."14' The MCWU opposed the idea that workers were resources or
commodities to be managed or bought and sold.
4
1
This does not mean that the MCWU refuses to promote training or
discuss wider workplace issues but does mean that the MCWU does so
by its focus on the worker. Thus, the MCWU is not opposed to promot-
ing training to enhance an industry or provide the skills a specific
employer needs. However, the MCWU demands that training develop a
worker's full skills in a trade.'" Indeed, the MCWU's response to its
1996 negotiations at Mitsubishi provides an interesting insight into how
the MCWU has implemented these principles. The union had demanded
a four percent wage increase, while the company offered only 2.5 per-
cent:
Prior to the negotiations starting the delegates decided that we
should try and achieve a wage increase of 4%. Union members
at Honda had fought to get an increase of 3.8% last year and
other motor assembly plants were due to negotiate soon.
The delegates agreed with the advocate, Graeme Clark, that if
we accepted less during the term of our contract than applied
elsewhere, not only would it undercut negotiations at other
plants, but it would mean that Mitsubishi would become the
lowest paid plant. This would encourage the other companies to
demand low wage rises to meet a low cost Mitsubishi challenge.
The delegates also recognised that the company hadn't done
very well in the last year. The company had been overstocked
and the interest bill paid had knocked any chance of them mak-
ing a profit. Everyone was appreciative that the overstocking
had not led to redundancies, as had frequently occurred in years
gone by. The company had carried the cost and so had earned
some consideration.
141. See Organizing Priority, M & C WORKERS NEws, June 1996, at 6.
142. Clarke Interview, supra note 111. This view is echoed by the UAW's New Direc-
tions Movement. Its leaders believe that society's greatest challenge is changing the capitalist
system's line from profits to people. See STEVEN DANDANEAU, A TOWN ABANDONED:
FuINT, MIcHIGAN, CONFRONTS DEINDUSTRmALZATION 27 (1996).
143. See Our Principles Are Not for Sale, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Dec. 1995, at 1.
144. See Training Levy Opposed, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Sept. 1995, at 9.
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-It was decided to suggest to the company that both their objec-
tive of a low cost wage round and our objective of rates of 4%
could be met by phasing in the wage increase. The company ac-
cepted this proposal.'
c. Employer Response to the CTU-Engineers' Strategy
Professor Estreicher, a longtime proponent of labor-management
cooperation, believes that employers will come to regard value-added
unions as partners and, in turn, will lead workers to join these unions."
The experience in New Zealand has not been positive on this measure."
As the excerpts above demonstrate the ideas advanced by the CTU
and Engineers Union, all of which are designed to improve workplace
productivity and thus to ensure stable jobs for their members, make
these employment groups the very model of a value-added union. Fur-
thermore, the views of the MCWU and TUF are those of a traditional
union. These differences, however, did not arise with the advent of the
ECA. The Engineers and CTU began espousing'these ideas beginning as
early as 19872"8 In other words, there has been nothing about the change
to a law based on a freedom of contract model that prompted the Engi-
neers or CTU to adopt a focus on workplace reform. Thus, it is doubtful
that a change from a traditional collective bargaining law to a law fos-
tering labor-management cooperation is necessary to persuade unions to
act in cooperative, nonadversarial ways.
It cannot, however, be said that law was irrelevant to this change on
the part of the Engineers. The Engineers began its shift, in part, due to
the enactment of the Labour Relations Act (LRA) in 198749 That law
was based on a traditional model of unionism, but the LRA expanded
145. Phased in Wage Rise Agreed, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Mar. 1996, at 4; see also
Contract Reforms Delayed, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Sept. 1995, at 5. The Mitsubishi con-
tract also contained a provision limiting work an employee can be asked to perform, whereas
the Honda contract had none. The MCWU argued that this explained why Honda had nine
times the rate Mitsubishi did for occupational overuse syndrome--that is, repetitive strain
injury-and back injuries. See Speed Up Increases Injuries, M & C WORKERS NEWs, Dec.
1995, at 3.
146. In his analysis, Estreicher has asked what role employer opposition may play in
the decline of unions. He rejects as explanations the example set by the Reagan administra-
tion, the ability to replace strikers permanently, increasing levels of anti-unionism, and the
desire to economize on labor costs. Rather, Estreicher attributes the decline of unions to "an
unleashing of competitive forces in the markets for American products and services" which
have exacerbated the underlying strains in the system. See Estreicher, supra note 75, at 9-10.
147. The impact on worker choice will be discussed below. See infra text, at nn. 311-16.
148. See Dannin, supra note 94, at 27-33, 38-39.
149. See NEW ZEALAND AMALGAMATED ENGINEERING AND RELATED TRADES
INDUSTRIAL UNION OF WORKERS, STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE: REPRESENTING WORKERS IN A
NEW ENVIRONMENT 3 (1987).
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the range of issues as to which unions and employers could negotiate.
Before 1987, unions were limited to bargaining only on economic is-
sues.5 After 1987, the Engineers began to focus negotiations on
nontraditional issues of increasing workplace productivity, worker in-
centives, redesigning skills, and training. 5' In 1987, its Auckland branch
negotiated a labor-management cooperation agreement (known as The
Nissan Way agreement) with Nissan Manufacturing.'
This shift in focus is worthy of note because it came into being un-
der the LRA, despite its being a labor law regime based on a traditional
model. Although it increased the scope of bargaining, the LRA did not
permit the sort of wide open, unstructured bargaining which has led to
the destructive gamesmanship possible under the ECA.'53 If anything,
however, other factors such as the state of the economy and industry, as
well as union leadership, were the key factors in affecting the divergent
approaches these unions took.
If the CTU and Engineers were already focused on labor-management
cooperation before the change in law, how have employers responded?
Have they embraced the value-added unions? For the most part, al-
though the Engineers have tried to expand its role to be more employer-
oriented and to have a cooperative relationship, few employers have
been eager to enter into such a partnership:
The result has been an unusual situation in which the Engineers
have implored management to restructure their work organiza-
tion and bargaining structures in line with the demands of a
high-technology, high value-added economy. Clouding employ-
ers' responses to these initiatives have been a combination of
factors: skepticism about the motives of the unions, uncertainty
about the ability of the unions to deliver on productivity, and an
unwillingness to recognise unions as partners in the restructur-
ing process."
Rather than taking up the Engineers and CTU's offers of partnership
in increasing worker skill levels and promoting workplace reform, man-
150. See id.
151. See STEVE O'NEILL, LABOUR MARKET DEREGULATION: THE NEW ZEALAND
EXPERIENCE 11 (Parliamentary Research Service) (1993) (on file with author).
152. See DEEKS ET AL., supra note 90, at 352-54.
153. The LRA did introduce the possibility of negotiating either on a multi-employer or
enterprise basis. There is some evidence that this was leading to a stalemated situation in
many agreements. One can get a sense of the difficulties this caused by the number of unions
that entered the ECA era with expired agreements and by the number of situations in which
employers were able to use the ability to force agreements to change the form of bargaining.
See Dannin, supra note 94, at 61-74.
154. Haworth, supra note 104, at 297.
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agement has often preferred to deal with its problems by simply cutting
pay or working conditions.' In this respect, the New Zealand experi-
ence has resembled the U.S. experience where many employers have
responded to increased competition by "taking a 'low-road' human re-
source strategy, one aimed above all at reducing current labor
costs.... [Indeed,] the fundamental problem in the 1980s was that most
employers did not follow a high-tech, high-skills path."'5
The Engineers' experience in this respect has not been unique. Other
unions which have tried to bargain about training and skills have also
found a lack of interest on the part of employers.' The New Zealand
Nurses Association made proposals, which requested training, work-
place design and reform, and improving employer-employee
communication; but, the area on which health boards' proposals focused
was lowering pay.' Management rejected union proposals on the
grounds that "issues relating to consultation with employees are outside
this document.' ' 9 Leaked board minutes of a medium-sized Auckland
manufacturer revealed that the directors decided to use the ECA to re-
duce workers' employment conditions because doing so would lead to
savings of hundreds of thousands of dollars and greater profits. These
directors did not consider using the ECA's flexible bargaining to ex-
pand, reinvest or engage in productivity-based bargaining."
Thus, even though the range of bargaining topics in New Zealand is
essentially unlimited, it is employers that have proved unwilling to fo-
cus on anything outside the traditional narrow range of issues. For the
most part, what employers are unwilling to discuss remains off the table,
because employers have been given so much power by the ECA that
155. See Peter Harris, The Limits of Cheap Labour, MANUFACTURER, Aug. 1992, at 10.
The Engineers has also had some notable successes in promoting training through multi-
employer bargaining. See generally, Dannin, supra note 90.
156. David Howell, The Skills Myth, in TICKING TIME BOMBS: THE NEW CONSER-
VATIVE ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 96, at 90. "The tyranny of the financial
markets' short-term outlook is a critical impediment. Rather than reward firms for the im-
proved worker-management relations that a high-performance workplace requires, Wall
Street investors put a premium on ruthless labor policies that they take as signals of man-
agement's dedication to efficiency." Jeff Faux, Is the American Economic Model the
Answer?, in TICKING TIME BOMBS: THE NEW CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY,
supra note 96, at 128, 133.
157. See Mark Gosche, The Impact of Enterprise Bargaining on New Zealand Workers,
in ENTERPRISE BARGAINING: EXPERIENCES FROM NEW ZEALAND WORKPLACES 36, 39, 40-
41 (ACIRRT ed., 1993).
158. See Nicola Legat, Bargain Bin Industrial Relations, METRO, Sept. 1995, at 104,
107.
159. Sarah Oxenbridge, Health Sector Collective Bargaining and the Employment
Contracts Act: A Case Study of Nurses, 19 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 17, 26 (1994).
160. See Michael Pearson & Rachell Rose, Sign or Resign: Who Wins With Contracts?,
MANAGEMENT, June 1992, at 57.
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they control the bargaining agenda."' As a result, many, though not all,
New Zealand employers have used their power to prevent discussion on
workplace reform, training, and increasing productivity."' A 1996 study
comparing employer attitudes in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada
found that New Zealand employers ranked lowest in willingness to in-
clude unions in strategic management decisions; New Zealand
employers ranked 1.94 on a 1-5 scale in willingness to include unions in
strategic management decisions. Australian employers ranked 2.14 and
Canadians 2.75.163 At the time, the survey was done, some Australian
states were moving towards or had enacted an ECA type law.'" Canada,
however, has laws resembling the NLRA model. Thus, Estreicher is not
correct in his prediction that value-added unions will prove attractive to
employers because unions have tried to become partners in strategic
decisions about the workplace; yet New Zealand employers have no in-
terest in including them.
The U.S. should think carefully before enacting legislative reform of
this nature, for the results have been destructive. Employers' attitudes
and their ability to enforce pay reductions as a way to deal with work-
place problems has meant that New Zealand skill levels have been
161. There are a number of ways in which this has come about. One is that the high
rates of unemployment in the early days of the ECA tipped the power in favor of employers.
In addition, unions and employers became convinced that the ECA would destroy unions
and, in some ways, acted to make that a reality. See Dannin, supra note 94, at 87-138. Fur-
thermore, the ECA makes employers more powerful by treating employers and employees as
equals when they are not. See generally Dannin, supra note 64. Finally, important decisions
by the Employment Court exacerbated the difficulties unions had in organizing and in bar-
gaining. See Dannin, supra note 90.
162. A recent book notes that: "While some New Zealand managers are enamoured
with the anti-union, downsizing approach of some American companies, others are building
new partnerships for competing in the marketplace, providing higher-quality services and
products and giving new meaning to work." Edward Cohen-Rosenthal, Foreword to Perry,
supra note 126, at x, xi. No doubt some employers are doing this, but not enough are, and the
ECA helps them avoid this tactic.
Making the situation worse, has been the leadership provided by the NZBR and its views
about training. In 1994, Roger Kerr stated that too much emphasis was being put on training,
that there were still a large number of unskilled jobs in the economy that did not require
training and warned that too much training for jobs available would only lead to "credentials
creep." Roger Kerr, Ten Myths About Training, in THE NExT DECADE OF CHANGE 161-63
(NZBR, ed., 1994). He suggested that the statistics on training were failing to pick up many
"important training experiences, particularly in small firms, such as co-workers 'sitting next
to Nelly' and keeping their eyes and ears open." Finally, he argued that appropriate levels of
training and skills were only likely to be achieved when markets are open to competition. Id.
163. See CLIVE GILSON & TERRY WAGAR, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND AND CANADIAN ORGANISATIONS:
A RESEARCH REPORT 12 (1996).
164. See id.
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declining rapidly in critical areas.'1 A 1995 survey found serious short-
ages in skills were affecting most businesses." Forty-five percent of
Auckland region employers reported skill shortages were affecting their
businesses."z7 Thirty percent of enterprises had serious or very serious
skill shortages." Most affected were manufacturing, financial services,
construction, transportation, and communication, and larger employ-
ers.' As the ECA was enacted, the retail industry was characterized by
intense competition and structural instability which reshaped the organi-
zation of work, and reducing pay and the quality of work for most shop
assistants. Many retail employers have gone into. "survival mode" and
their emphasis is almost solely on the return on investments. Thus
training is being neglected throughout most of the industry. This com-
pares to related industries, such as the motor parts industry where there
is a strong emphasis on training. Emphasis in the retail sector is on
newer technologies and centralized purchasing and marketing. There is
no place in most managers' thinking for training, job enrichment or
worker motivation.'"°
Accompanying this reduction in job skills and exacerbating the
problems New Zealand workers have experienced has been the deskill-
ing of managerial jobs.'
Even worse, ECA bargaining is creating agreements that are pro-
gressively more destructive to productivity and training. In 1993, fifty-
one percent of enterprises employing forty-eight percent of workers had
failed to take on training, quality improvement, or other workplace re-
forms, compared to forty-one percent of enterprises and thirty-three
percent of employees the year before.171 In 1993, only twenty-four per-
165. Employers reduced labor costs through lowering numbers of staff and changing
payrates but not through increasing training. Janet Hector et al., Industrial Relations Bar-
gaining in the Retail Non-Food Sector: 1991-1992, 18 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 326, 339-40. The
U.S. is currently suffering from a skills problem that the National Association of Manufac-
turers (NAM) says threatens its global competitiveness. NAM has called on employers,
unions and policymakers to address the problem. 'Skills Gap' Threatens U.S. Competitive-
ness, 156 LAB. RES. REV. 399 (1997).
166. See Erling Rasmussen, et al., Where Are We and How Did We Get There? Skills
Shortages & Industry Training in New Zealand, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1996 AIRAANZ
CONFERENCE-PERTH 463,467 (1996).
167. See id.
168. See id. at 468.
169. See id. at 467; see also Erling Rasmussen, Chronicle, 20 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 336,
342 (1995).
170. See Peter Brosnan, Labour Market Flexibility and the Quality of Work: A Case
Study of the Retail Industry, 16 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 13, 29 (1991).
171. See Brosnan, supra note 170, at 29-30.
172. See Whatman, supra note 107, at, 70; Rebecca Macfie, Employers Set Industrial
Agenda, NAT'L BuS. REV., Nov. 15, 1991, at 19; see also Rasmussen, et al., supra note 167,
at 464. The subject of training is further discussed below. See infra text, at nn. 250-51.
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cent of enterprises employing twenty-five percent of employees had in-
creased training.173 In only forty-four of 1,053 contracts studied was
there any linkage of improved productivity with pay.'74
Engineers industrial officer Rosalie Webster described the reaction
of Australian visitors to these conditions: "Australian companies who
come here seeking examples of advanced workplace change and skill
development are usually dumbfounded to find that industrial relations
here has been dominated by the narrow issues of wage costs, contract
bargaining and associated disputes since the Act came into force in
1991:,171 An Australian employer association, the Metal Trades Industry
Association (MTIA), concluded that New Zealand employers under the
ECA were paying less attention to training, quality, and service than to
changing working hours and pay.176 The MTIA found a dramatic decline
in apprenticeships and a shortage in skills.77
The evidence from this experience is that having unions focused on
an employer's productivity is insufficient to improve bargaining or pro-
ductivity. Rather, the New Zealand experience shows that having weak
unions in the midst of a weak economy has actually reduced bargaining
on productivity improvement and has thus proven disastrous for the long
term health of New Zealand society and the quality of working life for
most workers. Indeed in certain cases, expanding the scope of bargain-
ing created additional grounds for a stalemate or weakened unions by
forcing them to make concessions on fundamental issues . 78 As has been
the case with New Zealand, U.S. unions are still in a long period of de-
cline, and they also face strong opposition from employers. 79 This
opposition often comes in the form of explicit or implicit threats to move
173. See id.
174. See Raymond Harbridge, New Zealand's Collective Employment Contracts: Up-
date November 1992, 18 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 113, 121. During the last couple years, since
the passage of the Industry Training Act 1992, training levels may be increasing through the
creation of industry training agreements. See Rasmussen, et al., supra note 167, at 465-66.
175. Webster, supra note 127, at 13.
176. R. Boland, Changes to Industrial Relations Laws and Practices in New Zealand
and Their Implications 21 (unpublished manuscript) (July 1992), cited in O'NEILL, supra
note 151, at 19.
177. See id.
178. The dispute involving Designpower and the Public Service Association is a good
example of how powerless a union can be under these circumstances. The parties' maneu-
vering in that case was too complex to describe fully here. Suffice it to say that the parties
tried to use bargaining over preliminaries as a way to advance their cause. The law, however,
gave the employer so much stronger a position in such a situation that the union was forced
to concede in the end. For a full description of the case, see Dannin, supra note 83, at 57-60.
For a list of issues that may force union concessions, see id. at 14.
179. See GARY N. CHAISON, UNION MERGERS IN HARD TIMES: THE VIEW FROM FIVE
COUNTRIES 22-24 (1996); see also Gould, supra note 3, at D24 (decrying policies which
might lead to a race to the bottom).
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jobs."8 Indeed, despite changes in the AFL-CIO's leadership and in-
creased support for organizing, U.S. unions are still in a vulnerable state.
2. Labor-Management Cooperation
As discussed earlier, New Zealand employers have been strong sup-
porters of labor-management cooperation techniques. On this issue, as
with the question of what role unions should play in promoting em-
ployer interests, the CTU-Engineers promoted such programs, while the
TUF-MCWU was generally suspicious of them.
a. CTU-Engineers
The CTU and Engineers have promoted labor-management coop-
eration mostly in the forms known as participatory management, 8" job
redesign, job rotation, job enlargement, teamwork, and a "whole job
approach" as a way to break down barriers in work organization, and
gender and minority equality.8 2 The CTU argued that unions should be
in partnership with employers in order to develop strategies that would
help employers overcome worker resistance to change. The CTU ex-
plained that using the methods it advocated would avoid disputes over
skill content and job demarcation and would allow improvements to be
implemented more quickly.' 3
The Engineers' views on labor-management cooperation have been
strongly affected by its positive bargaining relationship with Fisher &
Paykel, one of New Zealand's largest appliance manufacturers and, by
1991, the only whitewear manufacturer left in the country. In 1981, the
Engineers represented eighty percent of Fisher & Paykel's workforce,
and Fisher & Paykel was one of New Zealand's most internationally
competitive companies" When asked to assess their accomplishments
during the economically difficult pre-ECA years of the mid-1980s, both
the Engineers and Fisher & Paykel concluded that "the whole process
would have been totally unsuccessful without the involvement of the
unions concerned." 1'5
Indeed, Fisher & Paykel's approach to the negotiation process con-
trasts sharply with many New Zealand employers. From 1985 to 1989,
180. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 34, at 9-10.
181. See Harris, supra note 155, at 10.
182. TRADE UNION EDUCATION AUTHORITY, THE COMPACT AND CURRENT UNION
ISSUEs 4-6 (1990).
183. See QUALITY FUrURE, supra note 128, at 21.
184. See Patricia Herbert, Burying the Hatchet, AUCKLAND STAR, Aug. 4, 1991, at D3,
D4; David Barber, Throwing off the Cloth Cap, NAT'L Bus. REv., Sept. 13, 1991, at 30.
185. Brian Wooller, Dairy Workers Visit New "Consultative" Workplace, FOOD &
TEXTILE WORKER, Apr. 1992, at 9.
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69,000 jobs were eliminated in the appliance industry creating a large
pool of unemployed. Rather than using this glut in the labor market and
the recent enactment of the ECA as an opportunity to drive wages down,
Fisher & Paykel negotiated an agreement in July 1991, with its fourteen
unions that moved to a consultative approach and guaranteed that Fisher
& Paykel would share relevant and even sensitive data with the unions.'"
Fisher & Paykel unions have thus jointly made decisions on sick leave and
discipline, a role many in the union have found uncomfortable.87
The Engineers has tried to tie traditional union issues to workplace
reform, training, and cooperation. As Rosalie Webster of the Engineers
explained:
The idea is to dispense with across-the-board increases linked to
cost of living and to wage justice between groups of workers. In-
stead the approach is to make pay increases a management tool.
Under the proposed new pay systems, pay is linked to attitu[d]e
and conduct and/or profit and/or whether a worker gets on with
the supervisor. The new systems are intended to link pay to the
performance of an individual and to break the link between pay
and skill and the link between pay and collective/union organi-
sation. "'
Thus, much of the Engineers and CTU's position on labor-management
cooperation is closely tied to their views with regard to improving em-
ployer performance.
It is not, however, the case that a change in law promoted this ap-
proach. Again, the Engineers were involved in labor-management
cooperation and workplace reform long before the ECA was enacted.
Once the ECA was enacted, they continued, as before, to advocate it as
a useful way to become a co-partner in the workplace.' 9 During my visit
to New Zealand in July 1997, the Engineers indicated that they were
beginning to rethink their positions on workplace reform and coopera-
tion because they had not produced results they regarded as positive. If a
change in this longstanding position takes place, it will be a dramatic
repudiation of the value of labor-management cooperation by one of its
staunchest supporters.
186. See Herbert, supra note 184, at D3.
187. See id.; see also Herbert Roth, Chronicle, 16 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 317, 318 (1991).
188. Webster, supra note 127, at 14. The Dairy Industry Memorandum of Understand-
ing, to which the Engineers were a party, demonstrates this philosophy. See Perry, supra note
126, at 104-05.
189. In the U.S., employers are establishing teams even without the enactment of the
TEAM Act. See LeRoy, supra note 5, at 80-81.
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b. TUF-MCWU
The TUF and MCWU's support for traditional unionism has trans-
lated into a jaundiced view of both job redesign and labor-management
cooperation.' 90 Indeed, the MCWU has been particularly critical of the
Engineers and the system of quality management, in which the Engi-
neers engages at Fisher & Paykel. The MCWU's position is captured by
a story in the June 1996 MCWU newspaper about Peter Lusk, a tempo-
rary worker at Fisher & Paykel.' 9' Lusk tells how his teammates pushed
him to speed up his pace by heckling and embarrassing him whenever
he failed to keep up." When he spoke with his union delegate (steward)
about the fast pace of production, the delegate refused to support him,
because they had put "'things like strikes and conflicts behind us.' ,993
Lusk described attending a company team-building event during which
Rex Jones, the Engineers general secretary, praised the company.194
Company head, Gary Paykel, then warned the workers about stiff com-
petition from Thailand and told them that the company was opening
new plants in the United States and Australia. 95 During his tenure, the
union agreed to a twenty cent per hour pay cut for new hires. In the end,
the union participated in the decision not to give Lusk a permanent
job.'%
There are a number of ways to look at this experience. On the one
hand, Lusk may be a slow, uncooperative worker, and the story may be
sour grapes motivated by his termination. However, incidents, such as
teammates' heckling a new worker, the unwillingness of the union even
to consider taking the side of workers when it might impair production,
and the pitting of workers against one another in the name of competi-
tion, raise important issues about the nature of work in such a system.
The no-buffer, no-error target of lean production can demand extremes
190. This view exists within the U.S.. Paula Voos, for example, argued that employee
involvement programs are only a new variant of the older phenomenon of productivity bar-
gaining and not evidence of a fundamental transformation. See Paula Voos, Introduction, in
CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 1, 2 (Paula Voos ed.,
1994).
191. See Peter Lusk, Team Work Nightmare, M & C WORKERS NEWS, June 1996, at 10.
192. See id. A similar situation occurred at a Mazda plant near Flat Rock, Michigan.
Workers who were injured trying to keep up with the pace of work were often ridiculed and
harassed by Mazda managers. The unit leaders encouraged their teams to yell insults at
workers on restriction. They told the team members that their work would be easier if it
weren't for people on medical restrictions. Workers who went to the medical department
were treated coldly and with suspicion. See FUNCINI & FUNCiNI, supra note 27, at 182-83.
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in discipline and pressure to achieve its results. It can also entail oppres-
sive forms of surveillance, control and intense workflow.' 9 Team
members who can vote on whether a new worker is retained or not
translates into a system in which, in effect, the key issue is whether the
other team members like you.' The story of Peter Lusk dramatizes and
personalizes the reasons for the MCWU's opposition to labor-
management cooperation.
It would be a caricature, however, to label the MCWU's position on
how to deal with employers as that of the recalcitrant, destructive tradi-
tional union. Along with its opposition to labor-management cooperation,
one must reconcile different behavior that does not support pigeonholing
the MCWU's relations with employers as either strictly adversarial or
cooperative. The MCWU's position simply does not fit into either the
category of oppositional, antagonistic unionism or of cooperation, in the
sense these are commonly discussed. The MCWU contract with Mitsu-
bishi reflects this complexity. The contract declares that employer and
worker interests differ in important respects. Despite this, the contract
says, each party agrees to promote the other's interests:
The parties to this contract recognise the employer's objective
of retaining and promoting a profitable business by providing its
customers with high quality vehicles at competitive prices, and
recognise the employees' objective of retaining jobs and reason-
able living standards and working conditions. It is acknowledged
that the industry operates in a highly competitive environment
which is influenced by government policies on tariffs. Without
sub-ordinating either party to the objectives of the other, the
parties agree to cooperate in achieving their objectives.
The parties agree that:
-employees will be provided with the opportunity to influence
decisions that affect them in the work place.
-quality will be put first.
-within the parameters of this contract a well trained and
flexible work force will be maintained.
-the importance and contribution of all to the success of the
company is recognized.
-they will treat each other with respect and dignity.
-they will act at all times in a safe, fair and honest manner.
197. See Perry, supra note 126, at 51-52; FuNCINI & FUNCINI, supra note 27, at 136-37
(teams created self-regulating attendance system and encouraged workers to pressure one
another to maintain rapid work pace so everyone minds everyone else's business).
198. See GRENIR, supra note 39, at 17, 29.
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-they will promote employee and employer behavior that is
consistent with accepted standards of conduct.
-they will develop communication channels and systems that
will keep all employees informed of things that affect them in
the work place.
-they will resolve problems in a non-adversarial manner
where possible based on consensus. '"
This preamble to an employment contract demonstrates the inade-
quacy of a simplistic adversarial paradigm versus a cooperative
paradigm. On the one hand, the contract's willingness to give credence
to the employer's needs and to support them sounds cooperative. On the
other hand, the preamble leaves no doubt that workers also have impor-
tant interests that differ from the employer's and that are worthy of
respect. Ignoring the workers' interests or trying to subsume them under
the needs of the firm is unlikely to succeed for long. Thus, this agree-
ment attempts to find a way to accommodate what are authentic,
enduring, and conflicting interests not by denying that one group has
any specific interests but by acknowledging the reality that areas of con-
flicting interests exist and must be addressed.
This agreement does not stand in isolation. It should be recalled that
the MCWU was described as approaching negotiations by asking not
only what it ultimately wanted and how accepting anything less would
affect the solidarity it was trying to achieve among workers across em-
ployers, but also whether the company could afford to pay this amount
and whether the employer had engaged in good faith actions which de-
served to be rewarded by the union." Basing a relationship upon a
realistic appraisal of the parties' interests and a mature appraisal of their
current situations seems more likely to lead to results satisfactory to all
parties than would ignoring them or subsuming one's interests.
The MCWU cooperates because it genuinely wants to do so and not
because it feels compelled to do so. In any case, if a traditional adver-
sarial union can cooperate or, even better, take a more realistic approach
to cooperation, this route raises the question whether any change to the
U.S. system is necessary for those who support real cooperation as op-
posed to cooperation in name only. Certainly, similar agreements have
come into existence in the current U.S. system, and the evidence is that
labor-management cooperation functions better and tends to be a more
199. Mitsubishi Motors New Zealand Ltd-Todd Park Employees Collective Employ-
ment Contract cl.1.1 (1996-1997). This contract embodies the concept that unions "are not
married to a system of narrow job classifications or adversarial shopfloor labor relations;
they are willing to cooperate and to participate." Voos, supra note 190, at 1, 17.
200. See supra text, at nn. 131-32.
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permanent feature when a union is involved in its establishment than
when a union is not involved."'
The bottom line is that there is no evidence that the ECA had any
impact in prompting either union to cooperate or not. In fact, the evi-
dence seems to point to other issues as more important in prompting
unions to engage in labor-management cooperation.
c. How Labor-Management Cooperation Is Used under the ECA
Focusing on union efforts with regard to labor-management coop-
eration tells little about how it actually manifests itself in New Zealand.
It is true that labor-management cooperation has come into increasing
use in New Zealand under the ECA and is now used at a rate far ex-
ceeding that of its neighbor, Australia. The form most commonly used
in New Zealand has not, however, been the basis for building union
strength or membership. Rather, New Zealand employers have been de-
vising ways to use labor-management cooperation without unions and
succeeding.203
The government itself has endorsed this particular style of labor-
management cooperation. For example, in a speech given eighteen
months after the ECA was enacted, Minister of Labour Bill Birch
praised the ECA for letting employers change hours, pay, shifts, and
other workplace terms. He advocated, however, that, in the future, em-
ployers should not simply eliminate worker's terms but should establish
a rationale that would gain employee support. This, he argued, could be
done by "the soft and hard conversion processes. The latter tends to oc-
cur when a company has to change its work practices rapidly and often
radically.... The soft conversion describes a more gradual change to
work practice which focuses on the need to maintain the trust and confi-
dence of staff."' The key to achieving this, Birch said, was employers'
using labor-management cooperation techniques.2
201. See COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT
FINDING REPORT 36-37 (1994) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT].
202. See CLIVE GILSON & TERRY WAGAR, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND CANADIAN ORGANISATIONS
0996); Alastair Duncan, Champagne and Staff Reports: The Wonderful World of "Wn/Win,"
LABOUR NOTES, Aug. 1995, at 5.
203. This should not be surprising, for there is evidence that labor-management coop-
eration is used in the U.S. as a method of union avoidance. See RICHARD HURD, ASSAULT ON
WORKERS' RIGHTS 43-51 (1994).
204. Bill Birch, Address to the Employers' Federation's New Zealand Business and In-
dustry Advisory Council's Labour Market Group (Sept. 1, 1992) (on file with author); cf.
GREINER, supra note 39, at 10.
205. See id.
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Indeed, to the extent that any training has taken place in the ECA
era, such training has largely been part of an effort to institute labor-
management cooperation and not to impart skills. Thus, one must be
cautious as to what is meant by training in New Zealand because train-
ing may not necessarily focus on skills other than those designed to
improve worker loyalty and attitudes towards their employers. For ex-
ample, the Canterbury Manufacturers Association said that, in its
opinion, worker training included basic worker attitudes rather than
skills.m Most NZEF discussions concerning "best practice" methods for
workplace improvement focus on improving worker attitudes.2
The major employer groups, the NZBR and NZEF, essentially deny
that more is needed than worker attitude adjustment to improve produc-
tivity. In 1993, NZBR spokesperson Roger Kerr told an Australian
audience that the improved productivity due to ECA incentives and
flexibility "are the stuff from which future folklore is going to be made"
and that employers and employees were working together, with trust and
cooperation.m Even if one accepts Kerr's figures, the workers' payoff
for cooperation and trust seems meager. Kerr told his audience that it
was a buyers' market for labor, with wage increases of up to eight per-
cent amidst productivity increases of seventeen percent.2°
Unfortunately, these figures were not accurate. Six years after the
ECA's enactment neither wages nor productivity has shown improve-
ment. '0 From 1990 to 1997, total productivity growth was but five
percent-an annual growth rate of less than one percent per year, far
below the figure suggested by Kerr of 8.5 percent per year.21' Kerr is cor-
rect, however, in the import of his statement. Workers wages show that
workers have not participated in whatever productivity gains were
made.212 In February 1996, Prime Minister Jim Bolger, the leader of the
party which had enacted the ECA, admitted that there has been only 0.1
percent annual average real wage growth from March 1990 to March
206. Skills Survey Identifies Gap, MANUFACTURER (N.Z.), Oct. 1994, at 7.
207. NZEF, HUMAN RESOURCES: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEST PRACTICE (1992).
208. ROGER KERR, THE CHALLENGE OF THE '90'S: LABOUR REFORM IN AUSTRALASIA,
SPEECH TO THE AUSTRALASIAN INSTITUTE OF COMPANY DIRECTORS WESTERN AUSTRALIA
DivISION, in PERTH 4-5, 10-11, 15 (1993).
209. See id.
210. Kerr's error may have arisen from the peculiar way in which the NZBR and NZEF
tend to measure productivity. Rather than use the standard economists' definition of a ratio of
effort to product, they measure labor cost. Worse, they often derive this information by
opinion polling; that is, they ask employers their opinions rather than making any actual
measurements. See Dannin, supra note 90, at Chapter 10.
211. See Brian Easton, The Economic Impact of the Employment Contracts Act, 28
CAL. W. INT'L L. 209, 214 (1997).
212. See id at 221. See supra text, at nn. 294-99; see also Roger Kerr, Ten Myths About
Training, in THE NEXT DECADE OF CHANGE 161 (NZBR, ed., 1994).
Spring 1998]
Michigan Journal of International Law
1995. "3 Again, this is far below Kerr's claim of four percent annual
wage growth.
It is important to keep New Zealand's use of labor-management co-
operation in mind when considering whether the U.S. system should be
made more accommodating to it. Most of the U.S. public has a vague
understanding of labor-management cooperation which equates it with
worker empowerment, a more worker-friendly job and higher produc-
tivity. A key reason labor-management cooperation has not operated that
way in New Zealand is that unions have been weak and unable to act as
full partners who bring something valuable to the relationship. This is-
sue will be discussed more fully below.1
14
d. Assessing New Zealand Labor-Management Cooperation
Critics of teams see them as an effective and deceptive way to pro-
mote management's ends, such as increased work pace or improved
performance, at the worker's expense. These critics point to peer pres-
sure from other team members as likely to arise, especially if the team
members face greater workloads or lowered remuneration should one
member not produce at an acceptable level. This pressure can make
teams more stressful for team members than direct supervision.2 ' In-
deed, Lusk's experience with labor-management cooperation has been
repeated in the United States, for example, at Mazda's Flat Rock,
Michigan plant. Workers there felt patronized and manipulated at team
meetings. They complained that management believed that if it said
teamwork and consensus often enough it could co-opt the workers even
while giving them no involvement in the decision-making process."6
They felt that the supposedly "cooperative" Mazda bossed them as
much as would "traditional" General Motors (GM) but Mazda used the
term "consensus" to disguise its domination of the workers.21
In fact Mazda unit leaders had even more unchecked power than
was the case at traditional automobile factories because there were no
formal guidelines or written standards, which, in turn, encouraged cro-
nyism, favoritism, and spying among workers.2 8 In addition, the United
Auto Workers (UAW) at Mazda was seen as playing a role similar to
that of Rex Jones at the Fisher & Paykel meeting-that is, of being con-
cerned about management priorities over workers' needs. One Mazda
213. Rasmussen, supra note 169, at 109, 116.
214. See infra text, at nn. 245-48.
215. See Knudsen & Grunberg, supra note 36, at 2.
216. See FUNCINI & FUNCIN, supra note 27, at 138.
217. Id. at 138-39.
218. See Id. at 139-43.
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worker commented: "'Sometimes it seems that the union wants to make
itself more attractive to management than to its own members .... """
The generalized views of labor-management cooperation as a win-
win method of securing greater productivity and higher worker con-
tentment are anything but certain. A recent U.S. study concludes: "In
reality, beneficial results [from participation programs] are not guaran-
teed and may be dependent on developing participation programs that
provide employees meaningful voice." If this conclusion is correct, the
form of labor-management cooperation commonly used in New Zealand
is unlikely to lead to greater productivity in the United States, for unions
and worker empowerment are not part of the program.
The New Zealand experience with labor-management cooperation
suggests that it would not be a system congenial to increasing U.S. un-
ionization. Except in instances, such as the Fisher & Paykel example,
there is no evidence that the form of labor-management cooperation ad-
vocated and in use by most employers and the government is one that
involves unions. Rather, labor-management cooperation is often ex-
pressly designed to exclude unions. As a result, persistent efforts by the
CTU and the Engineers have not been sufficient to change the opinions
of the most powerful employer groups in New Zealand.22' There is no
evidence to suggest that this result would be otherwise in the United
States.
3. New Forms of Organization
U.S. proponents of labor-management cooperation suggest that it
will improve union performance by allowing new forms of representa-
tion, with a preference for unions limited to a single enterprise, as
opposed to multi-employer unions. In addition, Estreicher, for example,
favors unions that would offer a variety of services to attract members.
Both these changes have taken place in New Zealand under the ECA.
New Zealand has moved from almost an exclusively multi-employer
system to an enterprise system, and unions have begun trying to entice
workers to become members by offering an array of nontraditional
services.
219. Id. at 159, 169-71.
220. See Schwochau, et al., supra note 36, at 397; see also DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT,
supra note 201, at 36-37.
221. How support for labor-management cooperation has affected employee support for
the CTU/Engineers position as opposed to the TUF/MCWU will be discussed below. See
infra text, at nn. 303-18.
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a. Forms of Organization and Bargaining Under the ECA
From the time collective bargaining was legalized in New Zealand,
in 1894, under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (IC&A
Act) through its last iteration under the LRA, registered unions could
have essentially one form. Each union's registration gave it representa-
tion rights over specific job classifications or an industry across all
workplaces within the union's geographical jurisdiction. Thus, the terms
of all clerical workers working for all employers within a designated
region were covered by the clerical workers agreement or award for that
area. An award was the document that set forth the workers' terms. At
one time the term accurately reflected the fact that they were created
through a process of interest arbitration. More recently award terms
were arrived at through negotiation. Negotiations in this system bore a
strong resemblance to multi-employer bargaining in the United States.
Awards could be national or regional in scope."' Within their jurisdic-
tion, they automatically covered employers or workers performing
covered work, even if the employer was not in existence at the time the
award was created.m
This award system played a vital role in the unionization of some
industries. New Zealand is still a sparsely settled country with many
small worksites. Travel is difficult through much of the country with
even vital links in some places being dependent on one-lane gravel
roads.m Thus, negotiations on a workplace by workplace basis would
often be impossible. Awards ensured at least a minimum common stan-
dard and protections for a substantial portion of employees doing the
same job, thus constraining the bidding down of wages, decreasing em-
ployer wage competition, and resolving a large number of disputes in
one set of negotiations.2
222. See LRA 1987 §§ 132-34.
223. See id. § 160. This was referred to as the "blanket coverage" right of registered
unions.
224. On the west coast of the South Island some one-lane bridges carry not only car
traffic but rail as well. The west coast is a temperate rain forest which receives as much as
fifteen meters (roughly forty feet) of rain a year, so while crossing these bridges amidst a
downpour a traveler may notice that the river is but inches from flooding the bridge. The
New Zealand Alps rise immediately to the east, so east-west traffic on the South Island is
limited to a very few places. In other words, once the traveler is en route on the west coast,
the options are essentially to backtrack or continue forward. Travel there can be breathtaking
for more reasons than just the dramatic scenery, which exceeds the beauty of California's
Route 1. California does not have two glaciers which reach from the Alps to the ocean on its
west coast.
225. See I MINISTER OF LABOUR, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR
REviEw (1985).
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Awards under the LRA from 1987 to May 14, 1991, were negotiated
following notice to the Chief Mediator, who then designated a mediator
to facilitate negotiations.226 The mediator then arranged for up to ten rep-
resentatives of each side to meet as a conciliation council. 227 Any
agreement these representatives reached was then registered as an
award . If the parties were unable to agree, the dispute was referred to
the Arbitration Commission which could, but only if the parties agreed,
decide the dispute and make the award. Otherwise, the Commission
only had the authority to act in the role of a mediator.29
These features were eliminated by the enactment of the ECA in
1991. Under the ECA New Zealand has indeed fostered the emergence
of new forms of organization. Indeed, this has been a dramatic change
and one that was intended and eagerly anticipated by the ECA's propo-
nents. Just as the ECA was enacted, the NZEF produced a video that
stated: "For the first time, it'll be easy for employers to negotiate
agreements to take particular needs of their own businesses or enter-
prises into account. Now that's a fundamental change that many
employers and employees have been after for a long time."2
According to the NZEF, by 1995 this prediction had come true:
In fact many employees, both individually and collectively, are
now choosing to be represented by a range of nonunion people
or organisations. This includes lawyers, accountants, private
consultants, a parent, a friend or a workmate.
The essential feature, however is that to gain the right to repre-
sent and to keep it, the representative is being required to
understand the needs and aspirations of the individual or group
being represented. To understand the needs and aspirations of
the employer concerned and to become a constructive part of
that enterprise focused partnership.
That is pretty new and radical stuff for most traditional unions
231and as those figures show, they have lost out in the transition.
It is certainly true that the ECA has permitted a nearly limitless
range of bargaining forms. With no oversight, limits or guidelines, the
form in which bargaining takes place is constrained only by the imagi-
226. See LRA 1987 § 139. The functions of the mediators are set out at §§ 251-58.
227. See id. at § 139.
228. See id at § 146.
229. See id. at § 147.
230. NZEF, Working Together: Employment in the 90s (Unpublished transcript of a
videotape on file with author) (1991).
231. The "New" Unions, NEwsLETrER (NZEF), 1995, at 15.
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nation and daring of those involved. There are two basic forms of con-
tracts--collective or individual.'23 The form, however, reveals nothing of
the process used to achieve the agreement. Employees may become sig-
natories to a collective employment contract (CEC) one-by-one, with no
collective negotiation or collective action of any kind. Conversely, an
individual employment contract (IEC) may be the product of collective
negotiations in the sense that it has terms identical to every other IEC in
the workplace, that it has emerged from actual collective negotiations,
or that it has come about by operation of law at the expiration of a
CEC,233 thus perpetuating terms negotiated collectively.
This flexibility is possible because of the law's minimalist provi-
sions. An IEC is simply "an employment contract that is binding on
only one employer and one employee."234 A CEC is collective only in the
most technical of senses. It is "an employment contract that is binding
on one or more employers and 2 or more employees. 235 In other words,
the addition of one employee to an IEC would change it into a CEC.
Although it has minimal numerical requirements, a CEC can be a pow-
erful document. ECA § 19(2) provides that when there is a CEC, no IEC
can be negotiated that provides terms inconsistent with "the applicable
collective employment contract" 236 Since a CEC comes into existence
with just two signatory employees, such a document can establish the
terms for all the employer's other employees. This system has resulted
in a complex array of agreements.
237
Added to this complexity of the resulting form of agreement are the
ways in which representation occurs. Unions may or may not be in-
volved in the negotiations, and this involvement may happen whether or
not a worker has authorized the union to be the worker's representative.
In a 1995 survey, for example, 60.8 percent of employees said they had
represented themselves in negotiating their most current contract, 34.8
percent had used a union representative, and 8.8 percent were repre-
sented by a fellow employee.
238
232. See ECA §§ 19-20.
233. See id. § 19(4).
234. Id. § 2.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. The details of how this system has worked have been explored by the author. See,
e.g., Ellen J. Dannin & Clive Gilson, Getting to Impasse: Negotiations Under the National
Labor Relations Act and the Employment Contracts Act, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 917
(1996); Ellen J. Dannin, Bargaining Under New Zealand's Employment Contracts Act: The
Problem of Coercion, 17 COMP. LAB. L.J. 455 (1996).
238. See Rasmussen, et al., supra note 167, at 456. The study's author urges caution in
accepting these figures because the study suffered from a number of methodological short-
comings.
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Although the NZEF and NZBR's statements are accurate when they
say that there have been new forms of bargaining, including more direct
negotiations, the description in these statements of how bargaining has
been taking place in New Zealand and why unions have played the roles
they have does not reveal the full picture. The reality of ECA-bargaining
can only be pieced together from a full understanding of the law and
how it has been used. The ECA evenhandedly allows either an employee
or employer to designate another as a representative to negotiate an em-
ployment contract2 9 Representation is a limited concept. First,
representation is presumed to play no role during the life of the agree-
ment, although there is no prohibition against it. Furthermore, although
an employer is required to recognize an employee's authorized repre-
sentative, ° recognition has little practical meaning. An employer is not
obligated to negotiate with a worker's representative even if the em-
ployer does recognize it. Authorization is also a technically complex
issue because determining the sufficiency of a union's authorization is
left to the employer.' Membership in a union will not give the union
authority to represent an employee, unless the employee has also ex-
pressly given the union that specific authorization.
Furthermore, the courts have even allowed employers to undermine
their employees' representative. In the most extreme cases this has in-
cluded permitting the use of threats, terminations, and other forms of
coercion to undermine a representative and to force an employee to
withdraw an authorization to represent.f2 There are also less oppressive
ways to achieve the same end. Employers can simply ignore a repre-
sentative. If the employer, however, wants to bargain with someone, the
ECA does not forbid employers from bargaining with an entity which is
not an employee's chosen representative. This has led some employers
to establish company unions or simply chose their workers' representa-
tive.2" Employers have taken unilateral control to determine who, if
anyone, would bargain for their workers, because the law permitted it
and because the environment did not constrain them.2" This result could
239. See ECA §§ 9-12.
240. See id. § 12(2).
241. See id.
242. See Dannin, supra note 237; see also Dannin, supra note 64; Dannin, supra note
94, at 172-175.
243. See REPORT OF THE MINORITY OF THE LABOUR SELECT COMMITEE ON THE
INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT ON THE NEW ZEALAND
LABOUR MARKET 6-8 (1993).
244. See Reports of the Committeee on Freedom of Associations, 77 International La-
bour Organization (ILO) Offical Bulletin 1, 228 (series B, no. 1, 1994) (considering case
No.1698 1726).
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also emerge from allowing U.S. employers to select employee repre-
sentatives.
b. Assessing Bargaining and Representation under the ECA
How have these changed forms and the employer's power to choose
the employees' representative affected negotiations? The fact that so
many workers say they have represented themselves in negotiations
might seem to suggest that New Zealand's freedom of contract regime
confirms Richard Epstein's claim that individual employees can bargain
concerning their own terms of employment. The question, of course, is
what it means to have bargained. Does this include merely setting em-
ployment terms or must there must be some evidence of give and take or
at least some input from all parties? In other words, how satisfactorily
has bargaining been carried on under this flexible regime?
One thing we know is that the ECA form of enterprise and individu-
alized bargaining has led to less bargaining in some cases because
negotiations on smaller scales are very expensive. One way this problem
has been resolved has been to move from the tradition of negotiating
contracts on an annual basis, with the trend to greater than one year to
two year contracts apparent by 1993.' Smaller employers have been
most likely not to renegotiate contracts. By 1993, eighty-four percent of
employees of employers employing more than one hundred had con-
tracts negotiated under the ECA; whereas, for those employing between
four and nine employees, only thirty-seven percent had contracts negoti-
ated under the ECA. 42
Less bargaining has taken place in other respects as well. The fact
that many contracts had no wage rates at all2'47 suggests that the em-
ployer-employee dialogue has not concerned wages. ' When the Labour
245. See Whatman, supra note 107, at 57-58, 61-62. This study showed that for 1993,
in fifty-eight percent of enterprises no new contract was negotiated in the last year. Id. at 58.
This is a slightly different approach to the subject than looking at the express term in the
contract and may indicate an intent to drift into longer term contracts in the low inflation
period of the 1990s.
246. See id.
247. See Raymond Harbridge & Anthony Honeybone, Employment Contracts: Bar-
gaining Trends and Collective Bargaining Patterns: A Review of the 1994195 Year in
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: BARGAINING TRENDS & EMPLOYMENT LAW UPDATE 1994/95 5,
11 (Raymond Harbridge & Peter Kiely, eds. 1995); Raymond Harbridge & Julia Lane, The
Effect of a Minimum Youth Wage in New Zealand, 18 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 275, 278 (1993).
248. A survey of students found that they had no input into their working conditions.
See Debbie Peterson, Secondary School Students in Paid Work, in LABOUR, EMPLOYMENT
AND WORK IN NEW ZEALAND 1994 189, 193 (Philip S. Morrison, ed., 1994). While this can
be dismissed as merely a problem of the young working at unskilled jobs, it may suggest a
more fundamental problem. The ECA is designed to rely upon individuals to bargain their
own terms and represent their own interests. If the first work experiences do not provide this
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Select Committee Minority (LSCM) issued its report assessing the ECA
in 1993, the LSCM found no real negotiation was occurring. In most
cases ECA bargaining involved employers insisting and workers acced-
ing.' 9 The Majority, which is the same party that had enacted the ECA,
also agreed that the ECA was having a troubling impact on workplace
relations.
[E]vidence received has also shown that some employers are
using the removal of compulsory unionism as a way to tell em-
ployees less than before about their rights. Witnesses said that,
especially in companies where the employer has actively en-
couraged staff to resign from a union, employers often impose
contracts without negotiations. Sometimes these contracts con-
tain scant information. about employment conditions. Many
witnesses, particularly from service and retail industries, said
employers do not communicate with them about their contracts
and frequently intimidate employees into signing contracts with
the message that they will be dismissed if they do not. °
The Majority report also noted:
A much repeated statement by employees was that the Act has
given too much power to employers. Employees feel powerless
to negotiate suitable conditions if employers refused to take ac-
count of their wishes....
Another factor much commented upon by employees is the lack
of a good faith bargaining provision in the Act. This related to
the feelings of powerlessness which employees feel, to in some
way ensure an employer enters into meaningful negotiations."'
There has been virtually no data collected on ECA bargaining other
than for larger employers. Service Worker Union organizer Judy Shep-
pard contended that small employers-the group least likely to have
reported its outcomes to the ongoing Raymond Harbridge survey and
completely absent by law from the government studies-"do not draw
opportunity, when will students ever learn the necessary skills? Furthermore, to the extent
that students are exploitable they provide a large group of workers who can undercut the
wages of others.
249. SEE REPORT OF THE MINORIrY OF THE LABOUR SELECT COMMnIrEE ON THE
INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT ON THE NEW ZEALAND
LABOUR MARKET 3, 5 (1993).
250. REPORT OF THE LABOUR CoMMrrrEE ON THE INQUIRY INTO THE EFFECTS OF THE
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS ACT 1991 ON THE NEw ZEALAND MARKET 20 (1993).
251. See id. at 17.
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up contracts with workers. They just tell workers 'these are the condi-
tions' and they can take it or leave it" 2
When one looks more deeply into what is meant when an individual
New Zealand employee claims to have represented him or herself in
bargaining, it appears that relatively little meaningful bargaining occurs.
Another study of ECA bargaining patterns reveals that when unions
were not involved fifty-six percent of initial proposals were developed
by management without consulting employees, while forty-four percent
consulted only with some affected employees. It concluded that there
was little movement from management's initial proposal. Only six per-
cent of negotiations for new individual contracts reported that making
significant modification management's initial position. A majority
(sixty-two percent) reported making minor modifications, and generally
these applied to a small percentage of employees. One-third of firms
with new individual contracts said that all employees accepted initial
proposed contract terms without modification.23
Only negotiations which involved unions showed evidence of
thought, preparation, and actual give and take.2 Samuel Estreicher ar-
gues that employers would tend to prefer dealing with value-added
unions as opposed to traditional adversarial unions.25 However, in New
Zealand management bargainers tended to view negotiations that in-
volved traditional unions and actual bargaining far more positively than
those without.26 For the most part, however, the dominant form of bar-
gaining appears to be employer fiat. "7
252. Georgina Bailey, Three-Way Trap Catches Workers, EVENING POST (N.Z.), Oct. 27,
1992, at 5.
253. See Ian McAndrew, From Regulation to Deregulation in New Zealand Labour Re-
lations: New Models of Bargaining Under the Employment Contracts Act 1991 8 (Jan. 5,
1993) (unpublished paper prepared for the 45th Annual meeting of the Industrial Relations
Research Association); cf Julius Getman & Thomas Kohler, The Common Law, Labor Law,
and Realty: A Response to Professor Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415, 1422 (1983).
254. See Ian McAndrew & Virginia Phillips, Bargaining Behaviour in New Zealand's
Deregulated Labour Market, in CURRENT RESEARCH IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE 9TH AIRAANZ CONFERENCE 276, 278 (Larry Sonder ed., 1995); See also
McAndrew, supra note 253, at 8.
255. See generally, Estreicher, supra note 8.
256. See McAndrew & Phillips, supra note 254, at 282-83. The study examined dy-
namics such as belief in the other team's honesty and friendliness, trust in the legitimacy and
far-sightedness of the other team's positions, and perceived emotional difficulty of the nego-
tiations.
257. See LeRoy, supra note 5, at 41, 78 (finding that employers in the U.S. tend to
dominate the teams they establish).
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c. Union Services
As discussed earlier, some have argued that U.S. unions need to of-
fer additional services as a way to attract members. New Zealand unions
have indeed responded to the ECA's regime by reinventing themselves.
The ECA both provides incentives to unions to do this in order to recruit
members and also makes this easier because the process of authorizing
representation and union membership means that there can be no free
riders. In other words, the only way an employee can have access to an
attractive service is by becoming a union member.
Unions in New Zealand have marketed themselves aggressively by
trying to appeal to a wide range of perceived member needs."' Union
magazines and pamphlets are filled with what are essentially advertise-
ments touting the extra benefits of joining. The Engineers offered free
Sky TV subscriptions' 9 and special rates for wine purchases.'
Sometimes trying to explain how these services have been inte-
grated into traditional unionism has proved difficult. Peter Conway of
the National Distribution Union (NDU) described the new union cam-
paigns for members:
In response to these changes, unions have generally developed a
broader range of services such as law centres, medical centres,
superannuation schemes, insurance schemes, funeral expenses
benefits, travel discounts - even "smart" cards. But fundamen-
tally the union "message" has not changed. It is still about
solidarity, collective organisation, and independent representa-
tion. The new services are additional aspects. They do, however,
emphasise that the union is not just a workplace organisation
but is a provider of collective security.
The Public Service Association (PSA), the union which represents
most government workers, announced:
We're always going to have to assert member rights and this
will sometimes lead to a showdown, but there's more to the un-
ion than industrial battles. We can buy a wide range of benefits
simply because we stick together, and I mean things like health
258. Unions in the United States have also responded to their declining density by of-
fering an array of services, including credit cards, financial services, legal advice, and
insurance. See Gary Chaison & Joseph Rose, The Macrodeterminants of Union Growth and
Decline in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS, supra note 89, at 3, 38.
259. See Sarah Boyd, Unions Attack Free Sky Offer, DOMINION (N.Z.), Dec. 13, 1993,
at 1.
260. See Insert, in METAL, June 1996.
261. Peter Conway, Stayin'Alive, POLrTCAL REVIEW, July 1993, at 8.
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services, welfare benefits, loans, discounts, and so on. It's im-
portant that it makes good, economic sense to belong to the
union.
262
Getting into the business of offering consumer goods and services
has proved not only to be a distraction from their central focus, but in
some cases it has also put unions into uncomfortable situations. Among
the services unions have offered have been those patronizing companies
while they were engaging in serious antiunion activities, such as Air
New Zealand. 3 The PSA offered an array of benefits, including health
and superannuation (retirement) plans. Although these might seem un-
controversial, they actually created difficult contradictions. On the one
hand, the PSA promised to oversee its health plan to ensure that it pro-
vided good service. On the other hand, the health plan was a potential
source of revenues, whose surpluses would be returned to the union.2"
The PSA offered superannuation to assist those who were suffering
from recent government cutbacks,265 but, of course, the government was
also the PSA's major bargaining partner, and the way in which the PSA
bargained affected the number who might qualify for benefits.
Not all unions, however, saw a focus on consumer services as a way
to attract new members. The Service Workers Union, for example, said
that the greatest benefit of membership was helping members achieve
traditional union goals: a fair wage to provide a reasonable standard of
living; good working conditions such as holidays, meal breaks, and paid
sick leave; fair treatment; solidarity with co-workers; access to a trained
union organiser; a fair contract; access to support, including legal sup-
port, when needed; and training.2' The same pamphlet, however, also
lists extra services on its reverse side, including medical care at union
health centres, health insurance, legal advice, retirement plans, life in-
surance, discount shopping, and low interest loans, as benefits of
membership. 7
The MCWU opposed offering goods and nontraditional union serv-
ices as a method of attracting new members and argued that unions
needed to reassert basic principles rather than consumer goods:
Unions are often "sold" to prospective members on the basis
that they are
262. Thorp Heralds Major Changes for PSA, PSA J., Oct. 1991, at 1.
263. See Guide to Union Welfare Services, PSA J. SuPP., Oct. 1991.
264. See, eg., PSA Health Plan, PSA J. Supp., Oct. 1991.
265. See, eg., Retirement Income Planning, PSA J. SUPP., Oct. 1991.
266. SERVICE WORKERS UNIONS, JOINING THE SERVICE WORKERS UNION: WHAT'S IN
IT FOR YOU? (on file with author).
267. See id.
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-an "insurance" if you get unjustifiably sacked
-an enforcer of your employment contract
-a provider of services, from discount shopping to cheap
health care, to life insurance.
While unions may do all of these things, they are not the basis
of unionism.
Unions were established to stop competition between workers
for jobs. In times of high unemployment such competition re-
sults in workers offering to work at lower wages and worse
conditions in order to secure a job. Eventually, competition
bet'een workers tends to lower wages and conditions for all
workers.'
The TUF agreed that unions should not be "industrial insurance
companies" and should have members rather than clients.269 However,
the TUF offered members a credit card with associated discounts as a
perquisite of membership" ° as did the Engineers."'
Even worse than these ethical and practical dilemmas for New Zea-
land unions is the fact that the choice of no representative is also
available and can be offered to workers by employers on compelling
terms-coercive or attractive-that will make the workers choose it.' 2
The PSA saw the ECA as putting it in competition with employers for
the hearts and minds of it saying, "We have to sell the union as never
before" ' 3 At the same time, the union has tried to make itself an ap-
pealing partner to employers:
We've also been nudged more firmly to understand business
practices so that we can talk on equal terms with employers. We
can make a positive contribution to the way enterprises are run
and of course we also have to know about their finances so that
268. Basic Principles Reasserted, M & C WORKERS NEwS, Dec. 1993, at 6. However,
even before the ECA was enacted, the MCWU had taken a position that it would offer those
things its members wanted. In one case this involved low-interest short term loans to help its
members escape the predations of loan sharks. These had a major impact on making it at-
tractive to nonmembers who wondered why their unions were not offering them similar
services. See Dannin, supra note 94, at 36-38.
269. See Maxine Gay, Directions for Unions, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Dec. 1993, at 7.
270. See Discount Card, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Dec. 1995, at 9.
271. See Boyd, supra note 259.
272. Employers can freely use an array of inducements and disincentives to persuade
employees not to join or be represented by a union. See generally Dannin, supra note 237.
273. Thorp Heralds Major Changes for PSA, supra note 262, at 1.
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we can negotiate in full knowledge of the employer's circum-
stances.274
Whether any of this made unions more attractive to members was
unclear. The disappointing results of the PSA's efforts to find and pro-
vide what workers wanted illustrate the problems unions have making
themselves attractive to employees. It polled its members and other
workers in an effort to attract more members by improving its services.
However, the feedback it received must have been difficult to imple-
ment. Members gave it good marks for communication but scolded it for
being bureaucratic, slow to act, invisible, out of touch, and "weak and
ineffective; a soft touch for the employers." ' This might suggest that
the PSA could satisfy those polled by being more aggressive in dealing
with employers. However, the advice on how militant members wanted
the PSA to be was mixed: "Members wanted their union to be demo-
cratic, dynamic and fearless in representing its members and
professional and responsible in its dealings with employers. When
forced to a choice, many insisted that a union should take a balanced
approach.""' Some said they would only remain a member if the union
was responsible and nonmilitant27
Thus, although New Zealand unions have tried to compete for
members by increasing the services they offer, this has also had negative
repercussions. It is also unclear that any of these extras have attracted
members in the ECA atmosphere.
d. Multi-Employer Versus Enterprise Unions
In the United States those who advocate labor-management coop-
eration associate it with promoting enterprise-based organizations.
Although in most respects the Engineers and the CTU are the very
model of value-added unions, on this issue they have advocated using
the ECA's freedom of association to promote larger, industry unions27' as
the only means to ensure unionism's survival. On the other hand, the
TUF/MCWU have supported enterprise unionism.
Although on this issue the two groups appear to have reversed the
roles we would expect to see within the New Zealand context and po-
tentially within the U.S. context, this makes sense when examined more
closely. A key part of the Engineers' strategy has been promoting train-
274. Id.
275. What People Had to Say, PSA J, Nov. 1992, at 2.
276. Id. at 3.
277. Id. at 2.
278. See WELL-RBSOuRcED, EFFICIENT, INDUSTRY FOCUSED UNIONS supra note 134,
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ing.r" Industry training can only effectively be done across employers,
particularly in the lower-skilled, lower-paid industries. Under the award
system virtually all negotiation was done on an industry basis, and
training was just one more industry issue to be taken up. Procedures are
very different in a system based in the enterprise. Workers who expect
to be paid low wages cannot afford to pay for their own training and,
indeed, may see no point in making an investment whose costs the
workers are unlikely to recover in the short term either in increased
wages or a better job. The individual employer which might wish to
train its workers will refrain from doing so out of fear that its newly-
trained workers will be able to demand higher pay or credibly threaten
to leave for higher pay. The employer which hires such a worker but
does not pay for training will benefit and will be able to pay higher
wages because it does not incur training costs. This provides a further
disincentive to other employers in the industry to train.'
Thus, if each actor makes rational choices in a system without in-
dustry training, no one will train, and the industry as a whole will
suffer.2" Unions may be the only institutions capable of fostering certain
sorts of industry-specific training.2 In addition, in a period in which a
philosophy of individualism is dominant, government is likely to feel
that training is not its role. Thus, even necessary training may go undone
in a society with a low level of unionism, low pay, and highly competitive
employers.
There are additional reasons, however, as to why the preference for
enterprise or multi-employer unionism is not as much of a reversal of
roles. Even though their bargaining structure is based on multi-employer
contracting, the Engineers' contract willingly accommodates the needs
of individual employers. In fact, its bargaining strategy is based in the
enterprise and expressly permits enterprises to vary multi-employer
agreements. 3 As a result, the Engineers actually incorporate a high de-
gree of enterprise bargaining and attention to individual employer's
desires.
279. See David Barber, Throwing off the Cloth Cap, NAT'L Bus. REV., Sept. 13, 1991, at
30.
280. See Jeff Faux, Is the American Economic Model the Answer?, in TICKING TIME
BOMBS: THE NEW CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON DEMOCRACY, supra note 96, at 128, 133-34.
281. See Hamid Azari-Rad, Anne Yeagle & Peter Philips, The Effects of the Repeal of
Utah's Prevailing Wage Law on the Labor Market in Construction, in RESTORING THE
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 32, at 207.
282. See Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF
AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 32, at 15, 25.
283. See Perry, supra note 116, at 62.
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One of those employer desires has actually been to have a system of
multi-employer terms." Thus, by advocating multi-employer unionism,
the Engineers has actually been promoting a form of unionism desired
by many employers. Multi-employer bargaining is low cost, maintains
industry standards, and creates a level playing field so employers can
compete on factors other than wage cutting. In fact, employers can find
it so desirable to take wages out of competition that some New Zealand
employer associations have written their own unionless model industry
standardized multi-employer agreements with the parties limited to em-
ployers and employee. Forty-nine percent of employees in the
hospitality industry are covered by multi-employer contracts negotiated
without a union.2" Some dairy industry employers also took the initia-
tive to create a multi-employer agreement, which they then hoped to sell
to the other employers."
Multi-employer bargaining has been popular with U.S. employers as
well. 7 In 1980, 33.6 percent of nonmanufacturing contracts were multi-
employer and 13.9 percent were multi-plant.' When manufacturing and
nonmanufacturing are combined, 40.4 percent are multi-employer. 9
The United States provides strong evidence that employers have agreed
that their interests are best met through bargaining at some level other
than single enterprise bargaining. The NLRB only certifies unions at the
enterprise level or smaller because the NLRA states that the Board is to
decide whether the appropriate bargaining unit is "the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof."'  Larger bargaining units
came about only because employer and union each agreed that aggre-
gated structures were of more benefit to them.
284. In fact, not only have New Zealand employers themselves demonstrated that they
like to keep their terms of employment relatively close to competitors, the NZEF has re-
sponded to this desire by maintaining a bank of contracts that allow this to happen. See
Employment Contracts Database, EMPLOYER, Apr. 1992, at 4.
285. See Harbridge & Honeybone, supra note 245, at 9.
286. See New Zealand Dairy Workers Inc. v. Hautapu Whey Transport Ltd., [1994] 2
ERNZ 549, 555.
287. For example, twenty percent of employers surveyed in late 1997 planned to mirror
industry patterns. The prediction by the analysts was that patterns would actually be higher
once the parties entered into talks. This was a typical year in terms of these plans. See BNA
Special Report: 1998 Employer Bargaining Objectives, LAB. REL. WKLY. (BNA), Dec. 10,
1997, at 4. This tendency of employers to want to take working conditions out of competition
is of longstanding in the U.S.. In the mid-nineteenth century, planters developed an extensive
labor code which bound them to pay uniform wages and terms and conditions of employ-
ment, so they would not compete with each other for workers. See Lea VanderVelde, The
Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 437, 491,493-94 (1989).
288. See RICHARD FREEMAN & JAMEs MED OFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 39 (1984).
289. See id.
290. NLRA § 9(b); 29 U.S.C. § 159(b).
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These are rational choices. Multi-employer bargaining may com-
pensate for small employers' power and expertise deficiency and lower
bargaining costs. Multi-employer bargaining recognizes that most em-
ployers negotiate with an eye on their competition. Also, multi-
employer bargaining ensures that competitors will make the same deal
and will simultaneously be hit with a strike or lockout, which precludes
rivals from taking each other's market share. When technological or
economic changes occur, multi-employer bargaining can more success-
fully resolve ensuing problems."'
Despite' the clear advantages of multi-employer bargaining, the
MCWU and TUF have espoused small unions, including organization at
the enterprise level. The MCWU advocated having one hundred percent
union membership in each workplace, having a single representative of
the workers in negotiations with employers, and "getting all workers in
the same industry organized into unions that are independent of the em-
ployer, democratic and which stand for co-operation with other industry
unions in the workers interests."'' The MCWU wanted unions to or-
ganize in decentralized sections so that each could determine its own
affairs, while retaining the ability to call upon the entire body for sup-
port.' 93 In other words, each workplace might have its own union, but
that union would be closely affiliated with a larger multi-employer or-
ganisation.
TUF/MCWU support for decentralization is not, however, coupled
with an ideology of "win-win" bargaining. While representation might
be within an enterprise, a union could only achieve its prime objective,
to stop wage competition among workers, if the union acts as the single
seller of labor. This was the case because the union's collective power
gives the union more bargaining power than an individual worker pos-
esses. A union's collective bargaining power is at its maximum strength
when all workers in an industry are in the same union. At a minimum,
where more than one union exists within an industry, those unions must
have the same goals and methods. When, however, some workers are
not in a union, are in a union that tries to appease the employer, or are in
unions which do not cooperate, a union's power to protect wages and
working conditions is reduced.29 In other words, the MCWU and TUF
291. See, e.g., P. WILLMAN, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND
INDUsTRiAL EFFICIENCY 138 (1986).
292. Basic Principles Reasserted, M & C WORKERS NEws, Dec. 1993, at 6. In the
United States, the New Democratic Movement, a radical caucus within the UAW, advocated
policies which they saw as being in society's best interests even though they might cost jobs.
See DANDANEAU, supra note 142, at 22-23.
293. See Growth to be Promoted, M & C WORKERS NEws, June 1996, at 6.
294. See Basic Principles Reasserted, M & C WORKERS NEws, Dec. 1993, at 6.
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advocated having many small unions but having them organized so they
can work together across employers when needed, thus functioning ef-
fectively as one unionized force.
The CTU and Engineers have been promoting even larger unions.
On June 9, 1992, the CTU told its affiliates that unions could only pro-
vide better representation if they were arranged in appropriate
structures. 95 This meant amalgamating and redefining their membership
bases around an industry or sector large enough "to permit effective re-
sourcing of all aspects of organisation and union action"' and allowing
a leading union to emerge in each industry. The leading union would be
the most relevant union with the greatest industrial leverage and would
take the lead on the form and content of bargaining, skills development
and job content, and advocacy of strategic policy requirements.2 To
achieve this, the CTU wanted the new amalgamated unions to operate in
one industry only and to resist organizing workers outside that indus-
try.29' Part of the motivation for these mergers was to enable affiliates to
resist employer pressure for negotiations at the enterprise level.
29
The TUF is opposed to the concept of creating a leading union
within each industry. The TUF believes not only that small unions can
survive and provide good service to their members but that this is espe-
cially important to provide for the representation of specific workers,
such as clericals. Clericals were not likely to see industrial unionism as
attractive because they work in small numbers scattered across indus-
tries. Bargaining and a union focused on an industry might easily ignore
the specific needs of clerical workers. In addition, as mainly female
workers, clericals might feel less comfortable in a union dominated by
male industrial workers. ° If representation was to be based on only a
few industrial unions, these workers might be left with no one to repre-
sent them.
The CTU's ideal of amalgamations leading to industry unions has
not, however, been the practice, even with regard to its usual ally, the
Engineers. The Engineers has not hesitated to absorb members regard-
295. See NZCTU, Union Structures & Inter-Union Relationships (1992).
296. Id. CTU was concerned that amalgamation had been hindered by worker choice,
employer strategy, and industrial change.
297. See id. at 2-3.
298. See WELL-REsouRcED, EFFICIENT, INDUSTRY FOCUSED UNIONS, supra note 134,
at 7.
299. See CHAISON, supra note 179, at 148.
300. Interview with Maxine Gay, union organizer, in Palmerston North(May 17, 1992).
Gay had been an organizer for the New Zealand Clerical Workers Union and the Public
Services Association before assuming the role of general secretary and president of the TUF
Id.
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less of their industry.?' The ECA not only makes this possible, it makes
it easy. Under New Zealand's law before 1991,3 a registered union had
the sole right to cover a defined occupation or industry within a desig-
nated geographical area. 3 Under the ECA, however, an employee can
choose any union as its representative and can change representatives at
any time without limit. Not only does this give individual employees
freedom to choose, it means that a union can grow by enticing employ-
ees to change affiliations and can thus come to represent groups outside
those it traditionally has. As a result, union membership has been any-
thing but stable.
Indeed, the Engineers has been accused of boosting its numbers by
poaching members from other unions, including several CTU-affiliated
unions.m The CTU has refused to censor the Engineers because the
CTU felt it had no right to interfere in internal union behavior. The En-
gineers has defended itself as simply heeding the CTU's call for strong
industry-based unionism.3
This problem has been a continual source of contention between the
Engineers and MCWUITUF. The MCWU argues that the Engineers's
conduct is destroying effective unionism by increasing divisions among
301. Even before the passage of the ECA, the Engineers had a history of mergers. It
"absorbed a jewelry workers' union in 1987, laundry workers', gold miners', and cement
workers' unions in 1989, and draftspersons' and stoneworkers' unions in 1990?" CHAISON,
supra note 179, at 147.
302. New Zealand became the first country to legalize collective bargaining when the
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act (the IC&A Act) was enacted in 1894. See A. J.
GEARE, THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN NEw ZEALAND 56-64 (2d ed. 1988);
Alan Geare, The Proposed Employment Relations Act, 18 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 194, 194
(1993).
303. See Peter Conway, National's Blitz: Labour Market Reform, 11/12 RACE GENDER
CLASS 2, 5-6 (1991).
304. For a detailed discussion on the law affecting union membership and how this has
affected unions, see generally, Dannin, supra note 64.
305. The TUF and MCWU accused the Engineers of poaching and exempted the Engi-
neers from their own anti-poaching positions because the Engineers were poaching other
union's members. See Growth to be Promoted, M & C WORKERS NEws, June 1996, at 6. On
the other hand, others could find "remarkably little evidence of unions 'poaching' members
from other unions:' Raymond Harbridge & Anthony Honeybone, External legitimacy of
Unions: Trends in New Zealand, 17 J. LAB. RES. 425 (1996); cf. Lea Vaughn, Article XX of
the AFL-CIO Constitution: Managing and Resolving Inter-Union Disputes, 37 WAYNE L.
REV. 1 (1990) (AFL-CIO unions developed voluntary methods to resolve such disputes).
306. See Mathew Dearnley, Union Battle Threatens to Rock CTU, N.Z. HERALD, Sept.
7, 1993, at 1. When the Communications and Energy Workers Union (CEWU) collapsed in
late 1995, most CEWU members were postal workers, not involved in the Engineer's indus-
try-manufacturing. The CTU, however, said that the posties should join the Engineers. The
TUF opposed this and offered to assist the posties in setting up their own union or in any
other decision they wished to make, with the exception of joining the Engineers. See Posties
Form New Union, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Mar. 1996, at 12.
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workers and enabling employers to play on those divisions. 7 The TUF
contends that in some cases employers have assisted unions in poaching
other unions' members in return for cooperative unionism, "the devel-
opment of business dominated unions where so-called 'workplace
reform' objectives of helping the employer become more efficient, pro-
ductive and internationally competitive take precedence over workers'
rights, wages and working conditions."' ' In short, some of the Engi-
neers' support for multi-employer unionism is based in its desire to
grow larger, and this desire, in turn, has exacerbated basic divisions
within the labor movement.
Most workplace terms in New Zealand have been set at the enter-
prise level. This change occurred almost as soon as the ECA was
enacted. By 1992, eighty percent of firms surveyed were covered by an
enterprise contract and eight percent by an employerwide contract. Just
before the ECA was enacted, only nine percent had an enterprise con-
tract and three percent had a multi-plant, employerwide contract, with
the rest being multi-employer awards." McAndrew found that this radi-
307. In fact, the MCWU specifically targeted the Engineers members at Mitsubishi and
elsewhere:
Now, what I want to do is, for example, the Ford Motor Company in Auckland
where the Engineers gave concessions, I want to go up there and issue a leaflet to
those people, saying: 'You don't have to put up with this-rubbish. You can join a
good union if you want. We can force your union to get in a good advocate, some-
one that actually knows something about the industry.' And I want to circulate that
leaflet in the middle of the year to the people in that plant and invite them to take
action to defend their interests.
Even if they ignore it, which I expect they will, at least when the Engineers Union
and the employer sit down to negotiate, both know there's someone out there that
they don't like that's willing to represent those people in a militant fashion and or-
ganize them. And so that acts to restrain them 10% and means that they give 10%
less concessions. That means when I go to Mitsubishi and they say: 'This is what
they've done at Ford's,' it won't be as bad as what they might otherwise have done.
Allowing there to be competition, I don't see as being necessarily unhealthy, basi-
cally because many unions have become totally collaborative, and I don't see them
breaking out of that mold, and I don't see why they should have a right to captive
prisoners, that people should have no hope of getting out of them and organizing
in a genuine fashion. So a law that gives people the freedom to reorganize, I don't
see, necessarily, that there's anything wrong with that.
Clarke Interview, supra note 111.
308. Membership Poaching Declaration, M & C WORKERS NEWs, Dec. 1993, at 6; see
also Disunity Costs Tegel Workers, M & C WORKERS NEws, Sept. 1995, at 6; Tasman Targets
Union, M & C WORKERS NEWS, Sept. 1995, at 3.
309. See generally, McAndrew, supra note 253. Many workers remained in limbo, their
conditions determined by old expired awards or with no contractual arrangements, something
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cal shift had occurred relatively easily, with the impetus to move from
awards to individual contracts coming from the employer eighty-eight
percent of the time. He also found that most of the bargaining preceding
these agreements was actually more in the nature of employers' impos-
ing terms. °
Does bargaining on an enterprise basis promote an enterprise focus
and thus promote the employer's business? New Zealand's current bar-
gaining structures based in the enterprise have not necessarily led to
improvements by anyone's measure. CTU economist Peter Harris ob-
serves:
By 'fracturing' the employment relationship to enterprise level,
the Employment Contracts Act massively shrinks the capacity
for industry strategic approaches to key issues of skills devel-
opment, career structure, national performance standards,
improved work methods to best international 'practice, and
greater worker confidence in the viability of the industry, rather
than the current employer."1
In fact, the various forms of multi-employer representation that now
exist in the United States came into existence because both employers
and unions agreed that they were useful to both parties. They too have
been an important basis for promoting workplace justice and practical
needs, such as training. Weakening those structures may well have the
same impact as the move to the enterprise as the basis for setting terms
has had in New Zealand.312
Thus, although in New Zealand under the ECA there has been an in-
crease in flexible forms of representation, increased union competition
and a precipitous decrease in multi-employer forms of bargaining, this
has not promoted bargaining, as that term is normally understood, or led
other desirable results. As the Employment Court said, currently nego-
tiations for an employment contract in New Zealand "can amount to the
presentation by one intended party to the contractual relationship of a
form of contract to the other and the former's refusal to deviate from its
quite close to the American system of employment at will. Id. at 17. These figures do not
include firms which have moved to individual contracts.
310. See id.; see also Rasmussen, et al., supra note 167, at 456.
311. HARRIS, supra note 155, at 10.
312. For a discussion of these structures, see Dannin, supra note 61, at 24-26; Hamid
Azari-Rad, et al., The Effects of the Repeal of Utah's Prevailing Wage Law on the Labor
Market in Construction, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note
32, at 207.
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offer."' The question for the U.S. system is whether this would be con-
sidered an improvement in labor relations that the law should promote.
C. Assessing the ECA as a Model for U.S. Labor Law Reform
Samuel Estreicher, a vigorous proponent of the sorts of labor re-
forms discussed here, argues moving to labor-management cooperation
based in enterprise bargaining with value-added unions will reverse de-
clining membership among American unions."4 This will occur, he says,
because employers will be less opposed to this new form of unionism,
which will impel unions to become partners in making an enterprise
more productive.1 Furthermore, workers will be more attracted to less
adversarial unions.1 On these terms, a labor law system would be suc-
cessful based on four specific criteria: (1) if it promotes productivity
improvements which attract employers to embrace unions as partners;
(2) if union membership increases; (3) if there is a positive social im-
pact; and (4) if workers are thus motivated to become members of
value-added unions as opposed to traditional adversarial unions.
1. Whether Productivity Improvements Have Motivated
New Zealand Employers to Embrace Unionism
Are workers attracted to joining value-added unions, and do em-
ployers want unions as partners in making productivity improvements
under win-win bargaining? Existing evidence from both the United
States and New Zealand suggests that the answer to both questions is
no.
First, the assumption that value-added unions promote employer
productivity appears to be incorrect for several reasons. Several studies
have shown that workers organized by traditional unions are more pro-
ductive than are unorganized workers . 7 In other words, whatever these
unions have added might be missing with less powerful, more compliant
unions; thus, employers might not experience increased productivity and
might not see a need for any union."8 Indeed, this speculation has been
313. Northern Distribution Union (Inc) v. 3 Guys Ltd, [1992] ERNZ 903, 915.
314. See generally Estreicher, supra note 8.
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. For cites to studies, see Kohler, supra note 24, at 282, n.13.; see also Kelley &
Harrison, supra note 28, at 247.
318. It is not possible to assume that management will always make the right decisions.
The actions and reactions of automobile companies during the past few decades are littered
with examples of poor and in some cases criminal choices. See BOWLES ET AL., supra note
30, at 12-13. Some union oppositionalism may make management slow down and rethink its
proposals.
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borne out by the New Zealand experience. The assumption that an ECA-
like regime would increase productivity by allowing employers to re-
move work practices that reduced output has not been borne out. The
ECA has indeed given managers more power to manage, and they have
used that power to eliminate what they saw as inefficient work practices.
However, these managers have not generated higher productivity.319
"[T]he gains to employers have been limited to lower pay and greater
freedom to manage, not in higher output per worker" writes New Zea-
land economist Brian Easton.32 The reasons for this unexpected
outcome are unknown. Easton speculates:
Perhaps insofar as there were worker controlled work practices
they did not affect productivity. On reflection that is not so sur-
prising. Workers have an interest in higher productivity because
they can extract higher pay. Perhaps there were only few or
marginal occasions when they restricted efficiency in a way that
reduced their pay."'
Furthermore, employers are unlikely to prefer value-added unions. Indi-
vidual employers are likely to be unable to measure productivity and to
discern precisely what is responsible for any changes in productivity.
What employers are far more likely to be able to measure are wage cuts
and labor costs. Reductions in labor costs are not the same thing as in-
creases in productivity, but that distinction may be meaningless to an
employer who is more concerned with how much it costs to make a
certain number of units.322
In addition, it may be that the power of workers determines whether
an employer is encouraged to take these factors into consideration or is
allowed to ignore them. It may also be that unions with sufficient power
to oppose or slow management decisions play a useful role in the man-
agement of the enterprise. The lesson, though, is that if employers will
319. See Easton, supra note 211, at 209.
320. Id. at 215.
321. Id.
322. There may also be a complex interaction between social factors and employer de-
cisions that affect productivity:
Indeed, the kind of technical factors emphasized in conventional productivity
theories-such as the rate of capital formation and technological change-cannot
adequately account for the slowdown in U.S. productivity growth....
'... Social factors provide a much more promising explanation [for the decline in
mining productivity]-the miners' rejection of unsafe working conditions, the
coal-mine operators' stonewalling on the safety issue, and the subsequent break-
down in labor-management relations.'
BOWLES ET AL., supra note 30, at 7; (1990). Easton, supra note 211, at 221.
323. See KORTEN, supra note 32, at 207-14, 222.
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not listen to workers' concerns, the result may be declining productivity.
Weak, compliant unions cannot get employers' ears.
It also ignores U.S. history to assume that employers would be re-
ceptive to unions as partners in management. In the mid-1940s
management feared that unions had expanded the scope of bargaining
into areas that were not properly those in which unions should be inter-
ested. It was felt that "absence of defined limits gave to collective
bargaining its sinister edge."32" Management wanted to reduce the scope
of bargaining and fought to do so. GM, for example, was willing to take
a huge loss in order to drive this point home. GM refused to bargain on
any matters designated within the sphere of management and "opposed
any form of labor-management cooperation that gave the union a place,
however minor or advisory, on management's side of the line."'32 Given
this history,3  is there any reason to believe that employers are now ea-
ger to share an enlarged menu of bargaining with unions?
All these factors suggest that employers will not want to take on a
union as a partner in improving its productivity. New Zealand employers
have overwhelmingly preferred to go it alone. Reading what employers
in New Zealand say about unions and what they have been doing, the
evidence is that employers have no interest in entering into partnership
with unions. Nothing suggests that U.S. experience would be different.
2. Union Membership under the ECA
Estreicher argues that his proposed system will increase union den-
sity both because this system will gain the support of employers and
workers.'" However, experience with ECA-style unionization is a pow-
erful rebuttal to this idea. Union membership in New Zealand was more
than cut in half within the first five years of the ECA's existence, and
union density dropped from 41.5 percent of the workforce in 1991 to
19.9 percent in 1996."2 There is no evidence that the free fall has
324. DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY STRUGGLE 163 (2d ed 1993).
325. Id. at 169.
326. See id. at 159-73. The same history also suggests that unions do not value control
issues as does management. The GM unions struck a bargain with management to let man-
agement manage in return for money. Early on a confident union official had claimed that
collective bargaining would progressively cut into management prerogatives because these
things affected the workers and built the union's strength. However, by the mid-1940s wage
increases had become the chief union goal. Id. at 171-75.
327. See generally Estreicher, supra note 8.
328. See Aaron Crawford et al., Unions and Union Membership in New Zealand: An-
nual Review for 1995, 21 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 188, 189 (1996). Another study in late 1996
found that private sector unionism had fallen to tweleve percent. Overall union density was
twenty-three percent, boosted by over ninety percent union density in the public sector. See
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stopped, and that union representation will not fall farther under the
ECA. The magnitude of the ECA's impact on unions in New Zealand
cannot be overemphasized. In just five years New Zealand unions suf-
fered the same level of losses, which took over forty years to accrue in
the United States.
No doubt there are many reasons why New Zealand unions have de-
clined so dramatically. One important reason seems to be that unions
have been so weakened under the ECA that they have little to offer most
workers. Union decline has gone hand-in-hand with deteriorating
working conditions, particularly for those in the lowest paid positions.
These economic losses hit almost immediately. There have been classi-
fied advertisements by experienced, skilled workers seeking fulltime
work for as little as $50e2 a week3" or even eager to accept no-pay, ex-
perience-only jobs.3 ' In November 1992, fifty percent of employment
contracts in a study-and these were the better contracts-provided for
a minimum adult wage of $328 a week or less, with some contracts pro-
viding a rate below the legal adult minimum of $245 a week.32
It might be argued that these conditions only mean that the law has
not had enough time to have an impact. However, even after five years,
low wages persist. The average minimum adult weekly pay rates among
New Zealand's largest employers in early 1996-arguably the ones of-
fering the best terms-ranged from a low of $306 in agriculture to a
high of $475 in transportation.33 In February 1996, Prime Minister Bol-
ger, the leader of the party which had enacted the ECA, admitted that
there has been only 0.1 percent annual average real wage growth from
March 1990 to March 1995.334 This reality is a far cry from the NZBR's
1993 ill-founded claim that in two years workers had seen their pay rise
by eight percent.
35
Of course, union density in New Zealand may reveal nothing about
unions as negotiators, since employers are permitted to negotiate with
Anna Smith, Labour Act Not as Flexible as Imagined, DOMINION (N.Z.), Nov. 27, 1996, at
25.
329. All figures are in New Zealand dollars.
330. See Situations Wanted, PRESS WEEKEND, May 30, 1992, at P-14.
331. See When a Christchurch cafeteria advertised a job for a kitchen-hand for no pay,
experience only, the cafeteria got seventy-three applicants. Russ Francis, New Zealander
Warns of Free Trade Havoc, VANCOUVER SUN, Jan. 16, 1992 at E3; for other examples, see
Dannin, supra note 94, at 120-29.
332. See Harbridge, supra note 174, at 121; Raymond Harbridge & Stuart McCaw,
Monitoring Collective Bargaining, in NEW ZEALAND IN RESEARCHING MANAGEMENT
STRATEGIES AND BARGAINING: PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE UNION / TERTIARY RESEARCH
CONFERENCE, VICTORIA UNIVERSITY, WELLINGTON 3, 14 (Linda Sissons, ed., 1991).
333. See DEPT. OF LABOUR, CONTRACT 12 (1996).
334. See Rasmussen, supra note 213, at 116.
335. See Kerr, supra note 209, at 4-5, 10-11, 15.
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any representative they choose. Estreicher argues that employers will be
attracted to value-added unionism. A cynic might well suggest that em-
ployers would certainly support a system that means lower pay for
workers because the decline in pay can translate into increased profits
for companies and increased dividends for shareholders. However true
this might be of New Zealand employers, there is no evidence that they
have embraced partnership with these value-added unions as a means to
achieve lower labor costs. Not only have they been able to achieve labor
cost savings on their own, but, as in the United States where "[t]here is
growing recognition that employer opposition to unions is an increas-
ingly important, if not dominant, determinant of changes in union
density rates:"" employer opposition to unions is also strong in New
Zealand. The power that the ECA gives employers to control recogni-
tion of unions has not given employers any reason to agree to negotiate
with unions, even with a union that is willing to be a partner. 7 This
could have been predicted from recent history which demonstrated that
New Zealand employers were accustomed to having unilateral control of
the workplace, even in the presence of unions. 38 When the ECA gave
them more power to act unilaterally, most employers decided to go it
alone.
3. The Social Impact of the ECA
It might seem self-evident that workers would not be happy with a
system that delivered low wages. However, the dimensions of worker
experience under the ECA is more complex than this. There is strong
evidence that New Zealand workers have not been not happy with their
lot under the ECA freedom of contract regime. This is now a long-
standing problem. A 1993 CTU poll found that forty-four percent of
workers wanted to leave their jobs.339 Many complained that they had
less power to control their environment.w Work accidents had increased
by fifty percent and the use of stimulants and mild drugs had in-
creased.'' When employees were asked about changes in their work
336. Chaison & Rosse, supra note 258; See also Hoyt Wheeler & John McClendon,
The Individual Desire to Unionize, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS, supra note 89, at 47, 65.
337. David Brody observes that in the new dynamic U.S. sectors, "no amount of union
enthusiasm for cooperative relations and employee involvement is likely to persuade em-
ployers that collective bargaining is preferable to a union-free environment. And... what
incentive would.., employees have for joining a union?" BRODY, supra note 324, at 258.
338. See Ellen J. Dannin, The Impact of Labour-Management Cooperation on New
Zealand Unions, 20 Vic. U. WELL. L. REv. 293 (1990).
339. See Greg Jackson, Study Finds Many Want to Quit Job, PRESS (N.Z.), May 21,
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conditions, the results were mixed.' 2 They felt they were working
harder, that communication had increased and that they were learning
new skills; but they felt less trust and security. All other measures were
mixed including job satisfaction, cooperation with management, and
promotion opportunities. 3
The impressions of unhappiness elicited by the poll are reflected in
workers' actions. Unhappiness at work extends even into the public
sector. Staff turnover among the public sector rose 17.8 percent for the
year 1993/1994 and an additional 21.4 percent for the year 1994/1995.3
When workers feel unhappy with work conditions but disempowered-
that is, when they feel they have no voice-the only way they can im-
prove their situations is to leave. Leaving is what New Zealand workers
have been wanting to do and increasingly have been doing.
Worker discontent is also leading to increasing levels of strike ac-
tivity, and increasingly expensive strikes.
STRIKES IN NEW ZEALAND--1992-1995
Year No of No of Person Days Estimated Loss
Stoppages Employees of Work Lost in Wages and
Involved Salaries $m.
1992+ 54 26,803 113,742 19.372
1993 58 21,303 23,770 2.683
1994 69 16,042 38,262 4.580
1995 69 32,048 53,352 6.813
1996* 73 42,571 69,996 9.828
Source: Statistics New Zealand, Work Stoppages: January 1997 4
+ reflecting strikes related to the pendency and enactment of the ECA
* all 1996 provisional
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See Rasmussen, supra note 213, at 116.
345. See Graeme Hunt, Labour Disputes Increase as ECA Loses Its Gloss, NAT'L Bus.
REv., Sept. 19, 1997, at 27.
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Many of the recent strikes have taken place in the public sector, re-
flecting a growing unhappiness among government workers. 6
This unhappiness is a problem not only for the workers concerned
but for New Zealand society as a whole. Turnover and strikes are expen-
sive for all involved. In fact the rates of turnover and of strikes may help
explain two phenomena: the decline in training and the failure to im-
prove productivity. High turnover or the risk of it inhibits training and
tends to lead to an undertrained and thus less productive workforce.347
Where employee turnover is high managers cannot expect employees to
provide the sort of information that can enhance company perform-
ance.
3 4
Perhaps New Zealand employers may eventually become suffi-
ciently concerned by this to question the ECA regime. So far this has
not happened. Despite the evidence, despite depressed workers' condi-
tions, and despite high employee turnover, New Zealand managers
believe they have had good workplace relations and high employee mo-
rale and satisfaction.3" However, there has long been a large gap
between employee and employer perceptions of workers' feelings to-
wards their jobs.
PERCEPTION OF WORKPLACE IMPROVEMENTS
350
Employers' View Employees' View
Job Security 60% 14%




346. See generally Rasmussen, supra note 213.
347. See Paul Osterman, Pressures and Prospects for Employment Security in the
United States, in EMPLOYMENT SECURITY AND LABOR MARKET BEHAVIOR: INTERDISCI-
PLINARY APPROACHES AND INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE, 228, 233 (Christoph F. Beuchtmann,
ed 1993). Or as economist Brian Easton puts it: "[L]ong term flexibility is undermined by
short term flexibility, which inhibits the worker from developing a loyalty to the firm, and the
acquisition of firm specific skills, while also discouraging the firm developing those skills in
its work force." Easton, supra note 211, at 216.
348. See Schwochau et al., supra note 36, at 397.
349. See CLIVE GI.SON & TERRY WAGAR, EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN AUSTRALIAN, NEW ZEALAND, AND CANADIAN ORGANISATIONS
12, 13, 17 (1996); see also Legat, supra note 158, at 107 (nineteen percent annual turnover
common).
350. See Whatman et al., supra note 107, at 68.
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This again suggests that there is poor communication, despite the
common use of techniques such as labor-management cooperation,
which is often believed to improve communication. These results further
support the conclusion that in New Zealand labor-management coop-
eration is not being used to empower workers or to gain their input into
improving their working conditions but rather to persuade these workers
to accede to their employer's goals.
This evidence suggests some important insights into labor relations.
It is striking that, as New Zealand employers have gained power, they
have lost touch with their workers. Even more, this has happened de-
spite an increased use of labor-management cooperation. This suggests
that employers may be less likely to understand their employees when a
system tends towards a very large disparity of power. In other words, the
NLRA's insights about power balancing are important and fundamental
to a functional industrial relations regime.
4. How Value-Added Unions Fare versus
Traditional Adversarial Unions
Do workers prefer membership in value-added unions over tradi-
tional unions? No study can be used to reach a definitive conclusion as
to whether one or the other approach has been the clear favorite when
workers have been faced with a real decision about joining a union as
opposed to answering a survey. Were a study to be done, it would re-
quire teasing apart the impact of industry growth and decline, worker
perceptions of employer actions, relative degree of felt power, the prior
union membership and experience of workers who have joined one un-
ion as opposed to another, the resulting membership of workers who
have left a union, the existence of employer coercion, and actions which
demonstrate individual employee choice as opposed to mergers
brokered at the union organizational level. Here, however, it is sufficient
to find evidence that demonstrates that at least some of the time workers
have opted for the adversarial union model over the value-added model
or that the collective actions of workers as found in union growth dem-
onstrates that workers have not rejected the adversarial union model for
the value-added model.
In fact, the New Zealand experience provides no evidence that
workers choose more conciliatory unions over traditional unions. More
specifically, when the MCWU is pitted against the Engineers, the
MCWU is not necessarily less successful in attracting workers. The
TUF/MCWU position of "'no wholesale concessions given to employ-
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ers, nor soft deals done to try and curry their favour' """ seems to have
found support among enough New Zealand workers to mean that these
organizations have been growing.
Specific incidents provide anecdotal support for the conclusion that
at least some workers have been attracted by the more traditional union
over the value-added union. For example, fifteen Northern Distribution
Union members at the South Auckland Nissan assembly plant took a
voluntary layoff rather than accept integration into the Engineers . 52 The
Public Service Association has also lost members who felt it was too
conciliatory.53 Furthermore, at sites such as Mitsubishi where the Engi-
neers was also once a dominant union, the MCWU has become the
union which not only has the largest number of members but also is the
lead union in negotiations'- 4 This does not mean that there have not
been instances in which workers have chosen the Engineers over the
MCWU. There certainly have been situations where this has happened.
However, what is important here is that they have not done this in all
cases.
As to the second measurement of employee preference, overall pat-
terns of union movement growth, the TUF has been growing and
gaining members and affiliates, despite its initial small size, despite the
ECA, and despite severe redundancies in industries it represents.
Meanwhile, the CTU has been losing members under those same condi-
tions. When the TUF was formed in 1993, the CTU had thirty-three
affiliated unions which represented 321,119 members.355 Two years later,
the CTU had twenty-five affiliated members (not as a result of disaf-
filiations but through mergers of members), but the number of members
had declined to 284,383. This is a decline of eleven percent over two
years. The TUF began with nine affiliates in 1993 and 20,800 mem-
bers. 56 Two years later it had grown to fifteen affiliates with 25,454
members-that is, an increase of twenty-five percent in two years. 7
351. Growth to Be Promoted, M & C WORKERS NEWS, June 1996, at 6.
352. See Herbert Roth, Chronicle, 17 N.Z. J. INDUS. REL. 247, 249 (1992).
353. See Grant Duffy, PSA Resignations Raise Fundamental Issues, PSA J., Apr. 1992,
at 7; Christopher Moore, John McKenzie: Always a Fighter But Never Blind, PRESS (N.Z.),
May 7, 1992, at 13; Clarke Interview, supra note 111; South's NUPE Gathers Steam,
LABOUR NOTES, Dec. 1992, at 6, 7; Regional Contracts in Health Only Way Forward, PSA
J., Apr. 1992, at 7; Roth, supra note 352, at 124.
354. See Mitsubishi, supra note 199, at cl.l.l.
355. See Crawford et al., supra note 328, at 191.
356. See id.
357. See id. It is impossible to compare the Engineers with the MCWU in this way, be-
cause it would necessitate teasing apart the impact of mergers, which have been a major
source of growth for the Engineers in particular during the last few years. The nature of these
mergers is such that they may reveal nothing about worker preferences.
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Although the CTU is still more than ten times larger than the TUF, these
trends cannot be interpreted to lend support to Estreicher's predictions
as to how labor-management cooperation would function."'
David Brody argues that the U.S. labor movement will not prevail
by retreating from a "them and us" basic orientation in an effort to ap-
peal to nonunion employers.
It is their employees that have to be persuaded, and if and when
that time comes, what will persuade them will be the only kind
of appeal that has worked with American workers since the days
of Samuel Gompers: namely, the identification of the union with
their demand for industrial justice."9
Indeed, at least one study has shown that it is not only employees
who are attracted by unions which act like traditional unions. New Zea-
land employers who have dealt with more assertive unions have tended
to have more favorable views of them.3W
III. TRANSLATING THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE
TO THE UNITED STATES
If the value-added union model is not attracting members in New
Zealand, is there any reason to assume it will operate differently in the
United States? As discussed above,"' the United States and New Zea-
land are sufficiently similar that, at a minimum, there is no reason to
believe similar results would not occur here. Indeed, they may well be
worse, for U.S. unions have undergone such a long period of decline
that they may be unable to take on a sufficiently activist role to regain
their former strength. Thus, the ECA experience should be carefully
studied before a similar system is enacted in the United States. If, on the
other hand, New Zealand's experience is directly applicable to the
United States, and there is no reason to think it would not be, adopting
our own ECA could spell the death of unionism. On these grounds,
anything resembling it should be rejected if one believes unions make a
valuable contribution.
Although there is a gulf between these two extremes, both historical
and current experience suggest that the New Zealand situation under
freedom of contract is directly relevant to what would happen in the
358. See BRODY, supra note 324, at 258.
359. Id. at 263.
360. See Ian McAndrew & Paul Hursthouse, Reforming Labour Relations: What South-
ern Employers Say, 16 N.Z.J. INDUS. REL. 1, 8 (1991).
361. See supra text, at nn. 82-84.
Spring 1998]
Michigan Journal of International Law
United States under a system based on freedom of contract and labor-
management cooperation. Furthermore, history and current events both
demonstrate that, no matter what they may say when polled, workers are
not attracted to a union which wants to be their employer's partner.
A. Historical Experience-Old Debates in New Forms
It is easy to assume that a statute of the NLRA's vintage must no
longer be relevant. Changes in technology, the workplace, and com-
merce and the advent of globalization seem to have so profoundly
altered the world that few laws could fit our new situation. It is easy to
assume this only until one starts to read the debates which took place
around the passage of the NLRA. Sixty years ago the Wagner Act hear-
ings examined and rejected reforms that were very similar to many now
being urged. 6
The NLRA's framers had before them the world that existed as the
result of a regime based upon freedom of contract. David Montgomery
recently explored the details of the freedom of contract regime at length
in Citizen Worker: The Experience of Workers in the United States with
Democracy and the Free Market during the Nineteenth Century.63 Work-
ers were weak, and government acted in a way that exacerbated the
disparity of power. Montgomery found that courts frequently intervened
to impose terms not agreed to or even known to the workers when those
terms strengthened the employer.3" On the other hand, government was
willing to support employer actions even though they violated statute.3 65
Indeed, workers entered into employment not as an exercise of freedom
but from necessity because a worker who does not sell today's labor to-
362. See Peter Feuille, Unions as Antagonists, Not Partners, in THE STATE OF THE
UNIONS, supra note 89, at 85, 91; Julius Getman & Thomas Kohler, The Common Law, La-
bor Law, and Realty: A Response to Professor Epstein, 92 YALE L.J. 1415, 1425-26 (1983);
David Brody, Labor's Crisis in Historical Perspective, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS, supra
note 89, at 277, 294-300; James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining and
the Statutory Aging Process, 74 NC. L. REV. 939, 948-58 (1996); see also RICHARD BLOCK,
ET AL., LABOR LAW, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND EMPLOYEE CHOICE: THE STATE OF THE
WORKPLACE IN THE 1990s 5-9 (1996).
363. See e.g., DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN WORKER: THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS
IN THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY (1993).
364. See id. at 43-45, 57-59, 151-52.
365. In 1877, for example,
Cincinnati employers refused to reduce the hours of labor to conform to a new
state law, which made eight hours a legal day's work. When thousands of workers
paraded through the streets to demand obedience to the law, they found their city
infested by almost two thousand guardsmen, eight Gatling guns, and a battery of
heavy artillery-defending the manufacturers who defied the law!
Id. at 101.
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day cannot sell it tomorrow." Indeed, Montgomery compares the effi-
cacy of freedom of contract versus collective action in bettering
workers' lot and concludes that job exit on an individual basis does not
change work conditions as effectively as collective action.36
Consequently, the ability to associate openly to advance their
own interests, and to act together to regulate their own lives,'
was the most precious of all liberties. Without it, constitutional
rights than has been historically conceived and elaborated in
terms of the attributes of property, the exchange of commodi-
ties, and the protection of privileged minorities from
majoritarian government, had little to offer to those who worked
for others in exchange for wages.'
Sixty years ago, testimony convinced Congress that this regime
should not be preserved, because it had plunged the country into eco-
nomic and social chaos. The Wagner Act hearings took great care in
examining the factors that led to this result. They concluded that em-
ployers were willing to pressure employees to forego the unions of their
choice.' Furthermore, the government helped make employers particu-
larly effective in squelching unionization by giving employers the
powerful advantages of incorporation. That is, it supported employer
collectivity. Indeed, the discussion concerning government support for
inequality is particularly pertinent in an age of multi-national corpora-
tions, a form which gains its power from the assistance of government
and law. When nothing balances the scales, the power of incorporation
and the forces of competition gave employers power which they wielded
in ways that led to devastating results. Economist Arthur Suffern testi-
fied that, in that period, the government had failed to equalize the
advantages employers had as a result of constitutional protections pro-
vided the institution of private property, as he said:
The drive among employers for competitive advantage and the
autocracy of management possible under the rights of owner-
ship has reduced the workers on many occasions almost to the
366. See id. at 49.
367. See id. at 158-59.
368. Id.
369. For example, when management at Pacific Greyhound Lines learned of one or-
ganizing drive, management contacted the drivers, called them into the office individually,
and handed each one: a contract, the newly formed union bylaws and constitution, and a
form to revoke the power of attorney that the drivers had given the union. NLRB 1 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935 at 234 (1949). For
personal experiences with employers and unions during the Depression era, see, for example,
SLAVES OF THE DEPRESsION: WORKERS LETTERS ABOUT LivEs ON THE JOB (Gerald Mark-
owitz & David Rosner eds., 1987).
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status of industrial serfs. On the other hand, the pace of compe-
tition set by the most unscrupulous has reduced most of the
employers at various times to the stage of bankruptcy. 7°
As the committee explored these problems and how the law had
contributed to them, the committee became more inclined to curb that
power so that the law would operate in a more socially useful way."'
The committee concluded that employers act collectively for their indi-
vidual interests and expect the community to resolve any problems they
create:
This leaves employers free to shirk their responsibilities of so
managing the economic system as to make it serve its main pur-
pose of providing the population with the best possible living.
In an industrial society worthy of the name, owners and em-
ployers should be leaders and builders as well as profit takers. Is
there any way of holding them to these responsibilities as long
as they are free to refuse to deal with their employees on a basis
which enables their employees to protect their economic right to
employment at the best possible terms?...
The Wagner hearings focused particularly on the labor-management
cooperation model versus the traditional union model. The NLRA's
drafters had before them the fresh experience of the failed National In-
dustrial Recovery Act (NIRA), which had promoted the labor-
management cooperation model through employer representation plans
(ERPs). On the one hand, "[c]orporate employers argued that labor's
rights could be fulfilled through employee representation plans (ERPs),
that is, by a system of works councils."3 On the other hand, collective
bargaining requires representatives whom employers recognize and deal
with in good faith; representatives chosen free from employer domina-
tion; and respect for the sanctity of agreements entered into. Before the
NLRA was enacted, these conditions did not exist. One witness testi-
fied:
Again and again cases have come before the National Labor
Board in which the employer flagrantly violated section 7(a) but
took refuge in the claim that he observed the language of the
370. NLRB, supra note 369, at 284.
371. See David Brody, Section 8(a)(2) and the Origins of the Wagner Act, in RE-
STORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 32, at 29.
372. NLRB, supra note 369, at 316.
373. David Brody, The Breakdown of Labor's Social Contract: Historical Reflections,
Future Prospects, DISSENT, Winter, 1992, at 32, 37; see also Feuille, supra note 362, at 91;
Kohler, supra note 27, at 518-34.
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statute. He made the defense that he met, received, and con-
ferred with representatives of his employees. In one extreme
instance an employer came to the National Labor Board and
held that he had observed the law, although it was clear that he
has had no intention of coming to an agreement.74
If the passage of sixty years can obscure the relevance of this de-
bate, more recent experience with the ECA reaffirms that lacking these
protections still makes workers vulnerable to abuse. Arthur Suffern ob-
served that labor regarded the prior legislation, § 7(a) of the NIRA,3 7 as
inadequate because it was "'merely a pious declaration of the right of
labor to organize and to bargain collectively .... [which went] to the
right of every employer to determine his own course as he will, regard-
less of the wishes of the workers." 3 76 He concluded that it was
impossible to expect "that the rules of the game will be fair, if those
with power and selfish interests at stake are allowed to make them."
77
The findings from these hearings appear in the NLRA at § 1, which
states that individual workers do not possess "full freedom of associa-
tion or actual liberty of contract" and thus cannot bargain as equals with
"employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of owner-
ship association. '37 The NLRA's solution is to "restore equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees."3 79 In other words,
as law had fostered changes that disrupted equality, law must act to re-
store the pre-existing equality. This suggests that unions must echo the
current corporate form if they are to have the power to represent worker
interests. Corporations today tend to exist and to draw their power from
features such as interlocking corporate directorships and multinational
operations. For unions to equal that power, they must exist in more than
the enterprise form."8 The NLRA was not the first statute to recognize
374. Testimony of Dr. Francis Haas, NLRB, supra note 369, at 147.
375. See 48 Stat. 198 (1933). For a brief discussion of § 7, see Brody, supra note 371,
at 29.
376. NLRB, supra note 369, at 315.
377. Id. at 316.
378. NLRA § 1; 29 U.S.C. § 151.
379. Id. (emphasis added). Some argue that society may now have a renewed faith in
liberty of contract. See Brudney, supra note 362, at 1029, n. 301.
380. See NLRB, supra note 369. The original title of this act was the Labor Disputes
Act.
§ 2 The tendency of modem economic life toward integration and centralized
control has long since destroyed the balance of bargaining power between the in-
dividual employer and the individual employee, and has rendered the individual,
unorganized worker helpless to exercise actual liberty of contract, to secure a just
reward for his services, and to preserve a decent standard of living, with conse-
quent detriment to the general welfare and the free flow of commerce.... It is
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that the worker's wage cannot be tied only to the market. In 1910,
French law recognized the role wages play in a worker's security. In that
case, as with the NLRA, law assisted work in transcending its economic
utility and to take on a social and collective dimension that transcended
the mere performance of tasks by individuals for pay.38
The NLRA hearings provide even richer insights into the reform
agendas which promote eroding boundaries between employer and un-
ion spheres in the name of labor-management cooperation. A
fundamental principle of many who advocate labor-management coop-
eration is to view workplace conflict as a psychological problem
resulting from distorted images, rather than as an inherent problem
within the hierarchical workplace relationship and inequality of
power.3 2 Labor-management cooperation is intended to permit the par-
ties to get past these psychological problems in order to increase
production for the employer and satisfaction for the employee, thus
leading to a win-win situation for both 3
The evidence from serious studies tends to show that labor-
management cooperation programs fail because they are based on a
false premise. They assume that tinkering with the employment rela-
tionship and attempting to remove adversarialness through
psychological changes is possible.
The adversarial relationship between labor and management
does not derive from some historical accident or from a colossal
misunderstanding that "better communications" or a "more
mature approach" can resolve. It stems from the fact that busi-
nesses survive by beating their competitors-and, other things
being equal, this means squeezing as much as possible out of
workers. Unions did not cause this conflict; they arose as a re-
sponse to it. QWL, too, is a response to this conflict-but it is
management's response.
A recent study of teams provides interesting insights into this issue.
It found that although, in the company studied, some positive effects
hereby declared to be the policy of Congress ... to provide for the general wel-
fare, by removing the obstacles which prevent the organization of labor for the
purpose of cooperative action in maintaining its standards of living, by encourag-
ing the equalization of the bargaining power of employers and employees, and by
providing agencies for the peaceful settlement of disputes.
NLRB, supra note 31, at 1.
381. See Robert Castel, Work and Usefulness to the World, 135 INT'L LAB. REv. 615,
618-19 (1996).
382. See Kohler, supra note 27, at 513-18.
383. See WELLS, supra note 35, at 2-3; see also Parker, supra note 39.
384. WELLS, supra note 35, at 13.
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were associated with team membership, such as lower absenteeism,
team members also suffered from higher stress, greater work-family
conflict, and increased smoking. On the whole, however, the study
failed to find the expected association between team membership and
job satisfaction. When the researchers then probed more deeply into the
nature of the teams they were studying in terms of "amount of say in
decision-making, exposure to organizational changes, and self-definition
of team membership,"3 " they found that team members regarded them-
selves as having little decision-making power. Furthermore, although
teams are supposed to introduce members to multi-skilling, the study
found no difference in the skill level of team and nonteam workers in
the workplace. Moreover, when the study investigated whether the em-
ployer's definition of who was on a team corresponded with the
workers' self-definition, the researchers found there was a difference in
point of view. When outcome measures were re-analyzed based on the
workers' self-definition, they all, positive and negative, became nqn-
significant.'" These results capture the lack of evidence that these sorts
of systems make a contribution of any significance to the organization
of work today.
The NLRA's fundamental insight is that the boundary between em-
ployer and employee must be maintained and must be clear; otherwise
the more powerful party will encroach on the weaker.87 Only when a
party is clear as to its own interests can it bargain effectively and make
appropriate compromises. Labor-management cooperation cannot erase
the fundamental differences between the employer and the employed,
nor should it try to. Not only is workplace codetermination more effec-
tive when it exists through unions, rather than without them,"
experience shows that participation in strategic decision-making can
only take place where unions are already strong.89 Given the current
weakness of U.S. unionization and these insights, proposals for a labor-
management cooperation system of labor relations are likely to have
series of unfortunate outcomes similar to those we have seen in New
Zealand.
385. Knudsen & Grunberg, supra note 36, at 12.
386. See id. at 13-16. Experience at Mazda was that workers were pressed so hard to
achieve high levels of production, they were not cross-trained and were often required to do
the one job at which they were best. See FUNCINI & FUNCINI, supra note 27.
387. See Brody, supra note 371, at 29; see also James Gross, The Demise of the Na-
tional Labor Policy: A Question of Social Justice, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN
LABOR LAW, supra note 32, at 54.
388. Kelley & Harrison, supra note 28, at 247.
389. Thomas Kochan & Kirsten Wever, American Unions and the Future of Worker
Representation, in THE STATE OF THE UNIONS, supra note 89, at 363, 375.
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Although the NLRA was enacted over sixty years ago, it embodies
wisdom and experience that continue to be relevant. Indeed, it has been
noted that, although there has been an increasing call for labor-
management cooperation in the United States, only thirty-five percent of
workplaces even claim to have transformed their production systems) 90
Given the tendency to remain with the old system, there seems even less
urgency to embrace labor-management cooperation and the existence of
a transformed workplace. 9' In short, those who study these issues seri-
ously find that there is little evidence that supports the conclusion that
this history is no longer relevant.392
B. Current Experience
Current U.S. experience also suggests that labor-management coop-
eration and freedom of contract continue to be inadequate bases for
constructing a labor relations system. When given an informed and free
choice, workers have not been attracted to labor-management coopera-
tion once they have experienced how it is used. In addition, a union's
promoting labor-management cooperation and a value-added approach
have not guaranteed success in winning members.
Case studies show that the form in which many workers have expe-
rienced labor-management cooperation programs is that management
tends to revert to traditional methods of control.93 Failure to fulfill
promises of increased worker satisfaction, self-realization, empower-
ment, and autonomy can result in a worker backlash directed against the
union leaders who engaged in cooperation.3 9 Estreicher notes that the
president of the UAW local that bargains with Saturn also faced strong
opposition as a result of his support for labor-management coopera-
390. See Larry Zacharias & Cathy Schoen, Flexible Production Systems, Workforce
Polarization, and Worker Collective Action, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-SEvENTH
ANNUAL [IRRA] MEETING 207, 208-09 (1995); but see Janice Bellace, Labor Law Reform
for the Post Industrial Workplace, 45 LAB. L.J. 460, 61-62 (1994).
391. See id.
392. See BRODY, supra note 324, at 253-57.
393. See WELLS, supra note 35, at 70-71. For example, a case study of Mazda's early
years found that workers felt patronized and manipulated at team meetings. They felt that
management believed that if it said teamwork and consensus often enough it could co-opt the
workers even while giving them no involvement in the decision-making process. See
FUNCINI & FUNCINI, supra note 27, at 138. Workers felt Mazda bossed them around as much
as GM but dressed it up by calling it consensus.
394. WELLS, supra note 35, at 70-71. The dissidents felt that Mazda had let them down
by being just like any other company. By contrast, they believed that their UAW local had
betrayed them by being unlike any other union. The UAW, they said, turned on its own
cause, ignoring the interests of workers at Flat Rock for the sake of currying favor with Japa-
nese automakers-collecting dues from 3000 new members in the process. FUNCINI &
FUNCINI, supra note 27, at 197.
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tion. 93 Worker experience with teams at Mazda's Flatrock, Michigan
plant led to precisely this outcome. Two years after the plant opened,
Mazda workers voted to replace the cooperative union officials with dis-
sidents. "Few workers in America had as much experience working
under a Japanese management system. Their decision to replace the co-
operative, 'procompany' union with more militant leaders was not the
product of youthful naivete" and occurred even though applicants had
been screened to be more cooperative!" ' Union dissident movements at
NUMMI also won as a reaction to the labor-management cooperation
program there."'
The embrace of cooperation may explain the UAW's failure to win
votes at other Japanese automobile transplants.
[T]he UAW, intent on creating a cooperative image with Japa-
nese automakers has refused to challenge management over
[health and safety] issues. As a result the UAW has not been
able to persuade nonunion workers at Japanese plants that it can
contribute to the development of a better, more equitable team
system. It was not surprising, then, that workers at Nissan-,
Smyrna, who were already earning over one dollar more per
hour than their opposite numbers at unionized Mazda-Flat
Rock, did not feel compelled to become part of a union that, in
exchange for its two hours of wages per month in dues, simply
promised to go along with the team system that was already in
place.
3 98
In other words, workers may feel no desire to choose a union which
has not been vigorous in representing their interests, or they may feel no
need for a union that essentially acts as a junior partner in the manage-
ment of the enterprise. This dynamic is certainly consistent with the
experience in New Zealand.
Workers are not likely to be attracted to labor-management coop-
eration programs for several reasons. First, while there is some evidence
that participation is positively associated with worker performance and
satisfaction, the effects are so small as "to raise questions regarding the
practical benefits of such programs.' 39 Labor-management cooperation
programs tend to encourage the worker to identify with the employer
and the employer's goals and to substitute these for worker and union
395. See Estreicher, supra note 75, at 11, n.30.
396. See FUNClNI & FUNCINI, supra note 27, at 210, 219.
397. See id. at 219; see also Dunlop, supra note 201, at 30-31.
398. FUNIN'I & FUNCINI, supra note 27, at 226.
399. Schwochau et al., supra note 36, at 379; see DUNLOP COMM'N REPORT, supra note
201, at 45.
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goals. As this creates conflicts for the worker between solidarity and
performing the job," the worker may become less enthusiastic about the
program. This is more likely to be the case if, as happened at Mazda, the
worker sees cooperation as closely connected to unpleasant characteris-
tics commonly associated with these programs, such as accelerating
speedups, compulsory overtime, jobs lost to machines, and lower occu-
pational health and safety protections with little or nothing received by
the worker in return.4 ' Furthermore, increased productivity, which may
but does not always result from labor-management cooperation," may
lead to job loss.0 3 Teams may also be associated with lost jobs when
company downsizing occurs in conjunction with the introduction of a
labor-management cooperation system.4'° When jobs are lost, unions
also lose members. Furthermore, if workers have come to associate their
union with unpleasant consequences, unions are unlikely to be seen as
attractive. In other words, the experience of labor-management coop-
eration may be disempowerment rather than empowerment. Taken in
these terms, it is easy to see why workers would not be enthusiastic
about it.
Indeed, workers may believe that one employer is sufficient and that
a cooperative union is offering them nothing of value.4° It may be that
narrowing a union's concerns to those of economics-and limiting even
that focus to the employer's bottom line-is not attractive to the public
which then tends to view unions as representing special interests. 4  In-
deed, U.S. experience has been that membership in traditional unions
grew at a time when employers were free to offer cooperative, value-
added unions. Eventually, that experience was taken as demonstrating
400. See generally, WELLS, supra note 35, at 78-95, 96-98; see also GRENIER, supra
note 61, at xix. Grenier explains that, while workers get a sense of belonging to their group,
they feel less community with other workers in the plant. Id. at 17. In fact, teams may be set
up to compete against other teams.
401. See WELLS, supra note 35, at 79.
402. A survey of recent studies found that.most had reported gains in productivity;
though one found no improvement in productivity when company records were examined,
and self-reporting. Results were also mixed as to whether teams reduced absenteeism. See
Knudsen & Grunberg, supra note 36, at 3--4; see also GRENIER, supra note 61 at 7-13.
403. See WELLS, supra note 35, at 76-78.
404. See FUNClNI & FUNCNI, supra note 27, at 226.
405. During my years working for the NLRB and in interactions with union members in
the years since leaving the Board, the most common complaint from union members I have
heard is that their union has either sold them out or is in bed with the employer. In my expe-
rience, no one has ever complained that a union had been too active. This suggests that the
adversarial union may well be more of a myth than a reality. The New Zealand experience
suggests U.S. unions have contributed to their own decline by not being more adversarial.
U.S. unions, however, have been in decline for such a sufficient period that they may be too
weak now to take on a more adversarial role.
406. See Kohler, supra note 24, at 289-90.
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that only collective bargaining provided a satisfactory form for ordering
the workplace."
It is important to bear in mind that unions are not organizations like
any other. They are more than merely vehicles for collective action:
[U]nions are a threat to established authority structures in a way
that most other collective arrangements are not. In the U.S. at
least, unions represent employees in the bottom ranks of the
workplace hierarchy, but to be effective they must persuade the
managers at the top of the hierarchy to provide employees with
work-related benefits that would not otherwise be provided.
This means that unions represent a challenge by the order-
followers to the normal (i.e., nonunion) authority of the order
givers. In short, among all their organizational characteristics
unions are first and foremost a threat to the nonunion workplace
order of things&.4°
In short, U.S. experience, both historical and contemporary, coincides
with the New Zealand experience under the ECA. The combined experi-
ence of these two nations demonstrates that labor-management
cooperation is seriously flawed as a basis for labor law.
CONCLUSION
Many currently propose an agenda for radical labor law reform in
the United States based on extrapolations from polling data, economic
analysis, and theory as to what leads to a properly functioning labor re-
lations system. Although a regime based on neutral or shared values
seems attractive in the abstract, empirical evidence demonstrates that it
is seriously flawed. All these proposals mirror those advanced by pro-
ponents of the Employment Contracts Act in New Zealand.
Furthermore, they have since been incorporated into the ECA or have
come into being since its enactment. Labor-management cooperation
has been implemented widely, flexible forms of employee representa-
tion are available and have been tried, and the main union umbrella
organization has embraced value-added unionism.
However, empirical evidence reveals that this regime does nothing
either to improve union representation or to advance productivity or
other important goals. There have been no productivity improvements
relative to other systems; indeed, there has been very low productivity
407. See Getman & Kohler, supra note 362, at 1422 (1983).
408. Feuille, supra note 362 at 90.
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improvement in absolute terms. New Zealand unions have not increased
their membership. Instead, they have gone into freefall, declining in six
years from 41.5 percent to 19.9 percent union density, a loss it took U.S.
unions forty years to achieve.O New Zealand unions have been unable
to attract members for a number of complex reasons, but an important
one is that they are so weak they are able to offer members very little.
Average annual real wage growth has been only 0.1 percent from March
1990 to March 1995.4'10 Furthermore, value-added unions have not been
embraced by employers. The ECA has contributed to increased em-
ployee unhappiness and the deskilling of the workforce phenomena that
should be cause for serious concern. Finally, there is no evidence that
workers will reject a traditional union for a value-added union. The
TUF, the traditional union umbrella group, enjoyed a twenty-five per-
cent increase in membership in its first two years of existence while the
CTU suffered an eleven percent loss.
4 11
Although it is normally impossible to test proposals for labor law
reform, New Zealand's experiences coupled with historical and current
experience in the United States suggest that reform based on a labor-
management cooperation proposal would be destructive to U.S. unions
and to important goals of the society such as increased productivity.
Theory and abstract analysis are useful but have their limits. When the-
ory is based on insufficient empirical evidence, it is of little use in
predicting outcomes. Fortunately, in this case, we have powerful empiri-
cal evidence against which to assess the reform agenda. This empirical
evidence demonstrates that the sort of regime many are currently ad-
vancing has consistently destroyed or weakened unions and debased the
lot of workers. Ultimately it is a system that workers have rejected and,
at least in the case of the NLRA, the government has repudiated. The
empirical evidence urges us to be cautious in moving toward a system
which has so quickly and so often been found inadequate.
409. See Raymond Harbridge & Aaron Crafword, The Impact of New Zealand's Em-
plyment Contracts Act on Industrial Relations 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 235, 250 (1997); see
also Crawford, supra note 328, at 189.
410. See id.
411. See id.
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